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ROBERT McNAMARA AND THE ART AND
LAW OF CONFESSION: “A SIMPLE
DESULTORY PHILIPPIC (OR HOW I WAS
ROBERT McNAMARA’D INTO SUBMISSION)”†
ROBERT N. STRASSFELD†† 
We have . . . become a singularly confessing society.  The confession
has spread its effects far and wide.  It plays a part in justice, medi-
cine, education, family relationships, and love relations, in the most
ordinary affairs of everyday life, and in the most solemn rites; one
confesses one’s crimes, one’s sins, one’s thoughts and desires, one’s
illnesses and troubles; one goes about telling, with the greatest preci-
sion, whatever is most difficult to tell. . . . Western man has become
a confessing animal.1
† My apologies to PAUL SIMON, A Simple Desultory Philippic (Or How I Was Robert
McNamara’d into Submission), on PARSLEY, SAGE, ROSEMARY, AND THYME (Columbia Rec-
ords 1966).
†† Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.  B.A. 1976, Wesleyan University;
M.A. 1980, University of Rochester; J.D. 1984, University of Virginia.  My thanks to Jonathan
Entin, Virginia Hench, Juliet Kostritsky, Peter Junger, Andrew Morriss, Kevin McMunigal,
and Margaret S. Russell for their comments on an earlier draft and their encouragement.  My
thanks also to all of my Case Western colleagues who endured with good humor two faculty
workshops devoted to this Article and to Hiram Chodosh, George Dent, Michael Grossberg,
Henry King, Rande Kostal, Robert Lawry, Kenneth Ledford, and Spencer Neth for helpful
suggestions along the way.  I also thank Kevin McMunigal for calling my attention at an early
stage to the acceptance of responsibility provision of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
for, along with Lewis Katz, answering my outsider’s questions about criminal law and proce-
dure.  Thanks are also due to Andy Dorchak, who outdid his usual extraordinary inter-library
loan efforts by obtaining a microfiche copy of John Rogers’s 1701 book, Death the Certain
Wages of Sin to the Impenitent, which recounts the story of Esther Rodgers that I rely on heav-
ily for my discussion of Puritan conversion narratives.  Finally, I thank Jonathan Hyman and
Jody Gale for their research assistance and Alice Hunt for secretarial support.
1. 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 59 (Robert
Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1976).
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In East and in West, nowadays, the idea of responsibility is in a sad
condition.2
Imagine a modern day Rip Van Winkle awakening from a nearly
30-year slumber in 1995.  Much about the world, from the end of the
Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, to personal and note-
book computers, fax machines, and music videos would be strikingly
different.  One apparent constant that he might find reassuring would
be the opprobrium heaped on Robert McNamara by critics both on
the left and the right.
Of course, the barrage of criticism directed toward McNamara
has not really been constant during our Rip Van Winkle’s lost years.
Rather, the criticism McNamara faced during the Vietnam War was
renewed 30 years later following the publication of In Retrospect,3
McNamara’s memoirs recounting his time as Secretary of Defense
and architect of the Vietnam War during the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations.  Whatever their differences regarding the Vietnam
War, most critics greeted McNamara’s musings on “The Tragedy and
Lessons of Vietnam” negatively and often vituperatively; neither
McNamara’s past conduct nor his recent reminiscences escaped their
criticism.  Critics dismissed the book as offering disappointingly few
new revelations or insights.4  Long-time McNamara critic David Hal-
berstam called it “a shallow, mechanistic, immensely disappointing
book,” which is “almost devoid of . . . insight.”5  Nor did it succeed in
the eyes of many on the level of craft.6
2. C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE CAUSES OF WORLD WAR THREE 170 (1958).
3. ROBERT S. MCNAMARA, IN RETROSPECT: THE TRAGEDY AND LESSONS OF VIETNAM
(1995).
4. See, e.g., Hilary Masters, A Crying Shame: McNamara’s Retrospective of America’s
Tragic Involvement in Vietnam Comes Just a Bit Too Late, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June
4, 1995, at G9 (“[T]hese 400 or so pages contain little that is new to anyone who has studied the
Vietnam War . . . .”); Allan R. Millett, McNamara Memoir Compounds Errors of Vietnam,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 7, 1995, at 6F (“There is virtually nothing original about . . .
McNamara’s account of decision-making or lack thereof in the Kennedy and Johnson admini-
strations.”).  But see George C. Herring, The Wrong Kind of Loyalty: McNamara’s Apology for
Vietnam, FOREIGN AFF., May 1, 1995, at 153, 154 (noting that while in general the memoir
adds little information or new insights, “McNamara does shed new light on the origins of the
bombing halt of late 1965 and his inception of the Pentagon Papers project, and he provides
important new examples of the way Johnson in the last years of his presidency squelched inter-
nal dissent . . . [along with] some illuminating personal insights . . . .”).
5. David Halberstam, Years Later, McNamara is Still Shameful, CAP. TIMES (Madison,
Wis.), Apr. 21, 1995, at 11A.
6. See, e.g., Randy Fertel, Who’s Sorry Now?, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Apr. 23,
1995, at E8 (describing McNamara’s prose as “bureaucratic” and “without distinction”).
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Critics reserved their bitterest words for McNamara, himself.
Many discerned within the pages of In Retrospect the same detestable
traits that they had long ascribed to him.  After all these years he was
still arrogant, still an elitist, still a sycophant; he still displayed a
bookkeeper’s or Harvard MBA’s sensitivity to human affairs, and
still did not understand the disaster that he was so instrumental in
creating.7  The odium has been unrelenting.  Former Congressman
Father Robert Drinan decried McNamara’s “moral illiteracy and ab-
ject cowardice” and asked, rhetorically, whether McNamara should
go to prison for his role in promoting the Vietnam War.8  Halberstam
called him a “charlatan” and a liar “so contorted and so deep in his
own unique self-delusion and self-division that he still doesn’t know
who he is and what he did at that time.”9  Journalist Woody West
characterized McNamara as a toady to former anti-war radicals who
had openly embraced the enemy during the war, but whose attention
and approbation McNamara now craves since they have become part
of the elite.10  While some critics faulted McNamara for failing to
voice his doubts about the war at a time when speaking out might
have influenced events, others faulted him for ever voicing his doubts
at all.11
Nor were his critics prepared to forgive him for past wrongs.
The New Republic’s Mickey Kaus was only slightly more strident
than his compatriots, writing: “Has any single American of this cen-
tury done more harm than Robert McNamara?”12  McNamara’s
7. See id.; see also Victor Gold, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam by
Robert S. McNamara with Brian Van DeMark, AM. SPECTATOR, June 1995, at 67 (book re-
view); Halberstam, supra note 5; John Kolbe, Joining Vietnam Protesters; McNamara Isn’t
Writing for Most Americans, PHOENIX GAZETTE, May 5, 1995, at B9; Woody West, McNamara
Met the Enemy and It Turned Out to Be Him, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1995, at 40.
8. Robert F. Drinan, Should Robert McNamara Go to Prison? (for Promoting the Viet-
nam War), NAT’L CATH. REP., Apr. 21, 1995, at 24.
9. Halberstam, supra note 5.
10. See West, supra note 7 (“McNamara lends credence [to the message of 1960s radicals
who opposed the United States’ involvement in Southeast Asia] as he squirms to patch his huge
ego.”).
11. See id. (“McNamara would do well by the nation he disserved at the Pentagon were he
to . . . take a vow of silence.”); Peter Lucas, 1 Man’s Silence Led Men to Their Deaths, BOSTON
HERALD, May 28, 1995, at 9; Michael Zuzel, Sorrys Cannot Give Us Back Everything We Lost
in Vietnam, COLUMBIAN  (Vancouver, Wash.), Apr. 13, 1995, at A13.
12. Mickey Kaus, Who’s Sorry Now, NEW REPUBLIC, May 1, 1995, at 6, 6.  Kaus conceded
that Lyndon Johnson bore greater responsibility for the Vietnam War, but he described
McNamara as a “Renaissance man” of harm.  Id.  He ascribes to McNamara responsibility for
sowing the seeds of the destruction of the American economy during his days at Ford Motor
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revelation that he was really a closet dove did nothing to rehabilitate
his reputation.  All the more reason, critics on the left concluded, to
hold him accountable for the carnage, or, in the words of the New
York Times, for “wasting lives atrociously.”13  Critics on the right,
conversely, took it as further proof that McNamara’s timidity was
largely responsible for American defeat in an otherwise “winnable”
war.14
Given the intensity of feeling that both the Vietnam War and
McNamara provoked in the 1960s, the response to In Retrospect is
hardly surprising.  What is more interesting about both the book and
the reaction to it is the common understanding of In Retrospect as a
“confession.”  The language of contrition, repentance, and confession
is prevalent both in the book and in the critical and public response
to it.  Further, there is near-consensus that McNamara’s mea culpa is
inadequate, although there is no consensus on how or why it fails.
This focus on confession is appropriate for our times.  The confes-
sional impulse has never seemed so strong nor so pervasive.  Public
confessions have come from all corners: from the expressions of na-
tional remorse by Japan15 and France16 for crimes against humanity
during World War II, to the Southern Baptist Convention’s apology
for its support of slavery and racism;17 from President Clinton’s apol-
Company.  Id.  During his stint as head of the World Bank, according to Kaus, McNamara
“helped ruin the entire world’s economy.”  Id.
13. Editorial, Mr. McNamara’s War, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1995, at A24.
14. See, e.g., William E. Colby, Vietnam War Was a Noble Cause That Lost Because of
McNamara, BUFFALO NEWS, May 7, 1995, Viewpoints, at 11 (arguing that McNamara’s mis-
takes turned the American public against the war); Old-timers Attack McNamara Book, COM.
APPEAL (Memphis), Nov. 10, 1995, at 2A (reporting on conference on McNamara’s book spon-
sored by the Vietnam Veterans Institute and quoting U.S. Grant Sharp, who commanded the
U.S. Pacific fleet in the early years of the war: “We could have won it.  We were not allowed to
do it, and that was caused by Robert McNamara’s use of his office as Secretary of Defense.”).
15. See Sheryl WuDunn, Premier of Japan Offers ‘Apology’ for Its War Acts, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 15, 1995, at A1.  As in the case of McNamara, Prime Minister Murayama’s apology
sparked controversy within and without Japan regarding both the appropriateness and ade-
quacy of the apology.  See id.; see also T.R. Reid, Asia Underwhelmed by Japan’s Apology,
WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1995, at A21 (detailing mixed reaction of other Asian nations to Japa-
nese apology); Sheryl WuDunn, Japanese Apology for War Is Welcomed and Criticized, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 16, 1995, at A3 (discussing reaction both inside and outside of Japan to Prime
Minister Murayama’s apology).
16. See Marlise Simons, Chirac Affirms France’s Guilt in Fate of Jews, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
1995, at A4.
17. See Gustav Niebuhr, Baptist Group Votes to Repent Stand on Slaves, N.Y. TIMES, June
21, 1995, at A2.
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ogy for the Tuskegee syphilis experiments,18 and Pope John Paul II’s
apology for the Catholic church’s mistreatment of women,19 to more
banal examples such as Hugh Grant20 and the daily burlesque of pub-
lic confession found on daytime television talk shows.21
The near-universal rejection of McNamara’s confession raises a
variety of questions about the function and meaning of confession in
public life generally, and in law more particularly.  What is the social
worth of confession?  How do we measure a confession’s adequacy or
inadequacy?  When do we require more than words?  What do the
criticisms of In Retrospect teach us, not only about McNamara, but
about the norms of confession and forgiveness?
This Article examines McNamara’s “confession” and the public
response to it within the context of an American tradition of confes-
sion in law and literature.  Part I traces that tradition to the criminal
conversion narratives and gallows speeches of colonial New England.
Puritan society had clear expectations of what it took to make a good
confession, and the Article identifies these rules for confession.  It
also examines the functions of confession in that society and argues
that these confessions had several social consequences, including
easing the consciences of those implicated in the criminal’s punish-
ment; bolstering civil and religious authority; warning the community
as a whole of the perilous state of their own souls; and, rather sur-
prisingly, creating communal solidarity with the condemned criminal.
It then considers the secularized form of this tradition, with special
emphasis on the role of a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility in
criminal sentencing.  While these secular confessions lack much of
the drama of criminal conversions and gallows speeches, many of the
norms for a good secular confession resemble their religious counter-
parts from Puritan New England.  While many of the rules of confes-
sion have endured, today’s acceptance of responsibility nevertheless
lacks much of the social meaning of Puritan confession.  Unhinged
18. See Alison Mitchell, Clinton Regrets ‘Clearly Racist’ U.S. Study, N.Y. TIMES, May 17,
1997, at A10.
19. See Celestine Bohlen, Pope Calls for an End to Discrimination Against Women, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 1995, at A11.
20. See Chris Riemenschneider, Actor Hugh Grant ‘Fesses Up’ to Leno on ‘Tonight Show’,
L.A. TIMES, July 11, 1995, at B1 (reporting on Hugh Grant’s admission during a Tonight Show
appearance after his arrest for “lewd conduct” that “he did a bad thing”).
21. See generally PATRICIA JOYNER PRIEST, PUBLIC INTIMACIES: TALK SHOW PAR-
TICIPANTS AND TELL-ALL TV (1995) (analyzing motives of talk show guests); Jane Whitney,
When Talk Gets Too Cheap, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 12, 1995, at 57 (former talk show
host likening the contemporary talk show to an “electronic confessional”).
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from the drama of sin, damnation, and salvation, and largely removed
from public view, acceptance of responsibility serves neither as a re-
minder to the public of the legitimacy of civil and religious authority,
nor as a warning to its members of the perilous state of their own
souls.  Further, it does not create feelings of communal solidarity
with the defendant, and it fosters the reintegration of the miscreant
into the community only in the sense that his prison term is over
sooner than it would be absent his acceptance of responsibility.  Part
II turns to In Retrospect, and to the various reactions it evoked.  Ap-
proaching the subject first in the manner of a review of reviews, this
Article examines the critical reactions to the book to elucidate con-
temporary expectations regarding meaningful confession.  It shows
that much of the criticism has been framed in terms that track the
norms for confession described in Part I.  It then applies these norms
and finds McNamara’s confession wanting.  The Article concludes by
considering the extent to which the variety of reactions to
McNamara’s confession reflects our failure as a nation to come to
terms with our Vietnam experience.
I.  CONFESSION IN LITERATURE AND LAW
A. Puritan Conversion Narratives
On July 31, 1701, before an estimated crowd between four and
five thousand strong, a twenty-one year old woman named Esther
Rodgers mounted the gallows in Ipswich to be hanged for the crime
of infanticide.22  According to the contemporary account of her life
and death, compiled by John Rogers, a local minister,23 she ap-
22. See Lawrence W. Towner, True Confessions and Dying Warnings in Colonial New
England, in SIBLEY’S HEIR: A VOLUME IN MEMORY OF CLIFFORD KENYON SHIPTON 523, 523
(Colonial Soc’y of Mass. 1982).
23. The story of Esther Rodgers’s life, crime, conversion, and death is told in JOHN
ROGERS, DEATH: THE CERTAIN WAGES OF SIN TO THE IMPENITENT: LIFE THE SURE
REWARD OF GRACE TO THE PENITENT: TOGETHER WITH THE ONLY WAY FOR YOUTH TO
AVOID THE FORMER, AND ATTAIN THE LATTER (1701).  In addition to Rogers’s work, my dis-
cussion of Esther Rodgers’s confession, dying words, and execution draws on DANIEL A.
COHEN, PILLARS OF SALT, MONUMENTS OF GRACE: NEW ENGLAND CRIME LITERATURE AND
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE, 1674-1860, on Towner, supra note 22, and on
Daniel E. Williams, “Behold a Tragic Scene Strangely Changed into a Theater of Mercy”: The
Structure and Significance of Criminal Conversion Narratives in Early New England, 38 AM. Q.
827 (1986), reprinted in 10 CRIME & JUSTICE IN AMERICAN HISTORY: REFORM 367 (Eric H.
Monkkonen ed., 1992) [hereinafter REFORM].  Because these sources are more readily avail-
able than Rogers’s book, where possible, I cite to the secondary literature and note their source
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proached death with such “Composure of Spirit, Cheerfulness of
Countenance, pleasantness of Speech, and a sort of Complaisantness
in Carriage towards the Ministers who were assistant to her [that she]
melted the hearts of all that were within seeing or hearing, into Tears
of affection.”24 Indeed, the ministers who contributed to John
Rogers’s volume, and probably most of the witnesses to her execu-
tion, believed that Esther Rodgers died a saint.25
While the final act of Esther Rodgers’s story was a picture of tri-
umph and salvation, her story began inauspiciously.26 Confession
played a critical role both in causing and in signifying her regenera-
tion.  According to her confessional autobiography, which lay at the
heart of Rogers’s book, Esther Rodgers was apprenticed at age thir-
teen to a household in Newbury, Massachusetts (a town neighboring
Ipswich).  There she was taught to read and catechized, apparently
with little effect.  At the age of seventeen, she had taken up with a
“Negro Lad” living in the same house and had become pregnant.27
She carried the pregnancy to term without detection, then smothered
her baby, burying it in her master’s garden to avoid “Public Shame.”28
Although she suffered through an initial period of guilt and
fright while completing her apprenticeship, Rodgers reverted to her
sinful ways when she began working in a tavern outside of Newbury.29
After a year, she returned to Newbury.30  She eventually found work
in a household where she partook of old bad habits and entertained
“Sinful Companions in a back part of the House.”31  Pregnant again,
Rodgers once more concealed the pregnancy.  She murdered and
in Rogers’s account for quoted passages.  The precise date of Esther Rodgers’s execution, can-
not, however, be found in the secondary sources.  Instead, see ROGERS, supra, at 137.  For an
estimate of the size of the crowd, see id. at 153.
24. ROGERS, supra note 23, at 153, quoted in Towner, supra note 23, at 523.
25. See COHEN, supra note 23, at 59-63.  The Reverend Samuel Belcher, one of the minis-
ters who tended to her conversion, described her hanging corpse as “consecrated” fruit.
ROGERS, supra note 23, at 120.
26. As Samuel Belcher wrote, hers was a story of “a Pillar of Salt Transformed into a
Monument of Free Grace.”  ROGERS, supra note 23, at 118, quoted in COHEN, supra note 23, at
60.
27. COHEN, supra note 23, at 61.
28. Id. (quoting ROGERS, supra note 23, at 122); Towner, supra note 23, at 523.
29. See COHEN, supra note 23, at 62.
30. See id.
31. Id. (quoting ROGERS, supra note 23, at 123-24).
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buried the child after delivery.32  This time, however, her crime was
quickly detected, and Rodgers was arrested.33
After a month of detention in Newbury, where she felt overcome
by confusion and fear of the punishment that awaited her, Rodgers
was moved to Ipswich to await trial.  In Ipswich, she initially resisted
the efforts of local ministers to help her to repent and to seek God’s
mercy and solace.  Eventually, the considerable efforts of several
ministers, especially John Rogers, in conjunction with the efforts of
many Ipswich laypersons, began to work a change in Rodgers.  She
repented, confessed her sins, and sought comfort in God, the Bible
and the companionship of the spiritual community of Ipswich.34  She
came to have a growing sense that she had experienced a conversion
and would be saved in the next world, although not in this one.
Those who spoke with her in prison or who observed her as she lived
her final days and then cheerfully faced the gallows tended to con-
cur.35
Esther Rodgers offered at least two public confessions.  Rogers’s
volume contained one.36  In the second, which she spoke as her last
statement from the gallows, she warned the crowd, especially the
young, to heed her experience and learn that the path toward great
sin begins with smaller sins such as disobedience and social inter-
course with bad company.37
Public confession’s role in Puritan New England went well be-
yond the rituals of execution, and Rodgers’s confessions should be
understood in that light.  Confession served an important function
both within Puritan churches and in broader society.  The church was
an important adjunct to the state in helping to maintain order, as
church discipline reached beyond modern conceptions of religious or
32. See id. at 62.  Like Rodgers, several other criminals featured in Colonial New Eng-
land’s execution sermon and criminal conversion literature were condemned for killing their
usually illegitimate babies.  This fact, combined with the references in their stories to keeping
“bad company” and engaging in fornication and other “lewd practices” cries out for a gendered
account.  See, e.g., id. at 55 (Sarah Threeneedles); id. at 72-79 (Patience Boston); id. at 89-90
(Penelope Kenny); id. at 147-49 (Elizabeth Wilson).  For a discussion of Cotton Mather’s un-
successful attempt to bring Margaret Gaulacher to public confession for the murder of her
child, see Walter Lazenby, Exhortation as Exorcism: Cotton Mather’s Sermons to Murderers, 57
Q.J. SPEECH 50 (1971), reprinted in REFORM, supra note 23, at 275, 279-81.
33. See COHEN, supra note 23, at 62; Towner, supra note 232, at 524.
34. See COHEN, supra note 23, at 62; Towner, supra note 23, at 524.
35. See COHEN, supra note 23, at 62-63.
36. See ROGERS, supra note 23, at 121-27, 133-34.
37. See id. at 63.
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moral offenses.38  Churches could discipline by admonition or, ulti-
mately, excommunication.  In both instances the church sought the
repentance and reformation of the individual.  A measure of that re-
pentance, although not necessarily a sufficient indicator when unac-
companied by changed behavior, was the offender’s willingness to
confess her misdeeds to the congregation.  The congregation as a
whole took great pains to bring the offender to this point of confes-
sion.39
Confession similarly played an important role in the New Eng-
land courts.  As with church discipline, the goal was to restore the
criminal to the community by reawakening his conscience and re-
forming him.
To accomplish this goal, New England courts sought to make the
offender “an active participant in the punitive process.”40  New Eng-
land Puritans understood “conviction” to have the secondary mean-
ing of convincing the wrongdoer of the wrongfulness of his acts and
of the legitimacy of the court’s response.41  Real conviction, manifest
in confession, would often serve to mitigate punishment in noncapital
cases.42  Consistent with this emphasis on reawakening the offender’s
conscience and encouraging reformation were the common punish-
ments of public admonition, and of the injunction to confess publicly
or to apologize publicly to the victim.43
Public confession was, in other words, commonplace in Puritan
New England.  Given its pervasiveness and its important role in
maintaining an orderly society, New Englanders quite naturally de-
veloped certain expectations and norms regarding confession.  First,
confession was not an end in itself; instead, it was a means of progres-
38. See GEORGE LEE HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS: A
STUDY IN TRADITION AND DESIGN 91 (1960).
39. See id. at 92-93; Towner, supra note 23, at 526-27.
40. HASKINS, supra note 38, at 206; see also Mark D. Cahn, Punishment, Discretion, and
the Codification of Prescribed Penalties in Colonial Massachusetts, 33 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 107,
127 (1989) (discussing the willingness of judges to impose more lenient punishment if an of-
fender admitted wrongdoing); Towner, supra note 23, at 528-29 (discussing three types of con-
fessions in seventeenth century Massachusetts: a simple admission of guilt at the time of trial; a
public acknowledgement of crime, often required as part of the offender’s sentence; and a con-
fession after trial and sentencing but before the sentence was over—often part of a plea for
clemency).
41. See HASKINS, supra note 38, at 207.
42. See id. at 207; Cahn, supra note 40, at 127.  Cahn also notes, however, that the “Cotton
Code” of 1648 limited magisterial discretion to mitigate punishment.  See id. at 132.
43. See id. at 209-10.
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sion to something else: most importantly, restoration of the individ-
ual to church or society, and, perhaps, with God’s grace, regeneration
of the miscreant as a saint.
Further, the path towards sincere repentance and salvation was
both difficult and strictly charted, and no one could make the journey
alone.  Rodgers’s contemporaries regarded Satan as a powerful and
omnipresent adversary. 44  Any struggle on behalf of Esther Rodgers
against so cunning and seductive an opponent would not be easy.45
Recall that Rodgers’s first response to her crime was fear and confu-
sion, not remorse.  Rodgers wrote: “Satan made me believe that it
was impossible such a Sinner, should be saved. . . . It was Satans [sic]
Temptation to keep me from Repentance.”46  It was only through the
combined efforts of John Rogers and many others that she gradually
began to confront both her crime and her past with a sentiment of
true penitence.
Nor would any route to repentance and regeneration do.  As
Daniel Williams has described, Rogers’s volume, like many other
contemporary criminal conversion narratives, set out a step-by-step
guide to salvation.47  The prescribed path required that the con-
demned first be brought to the point of “spiritual agony” by making
him aware of the full horror of his sins.48  The purpose of this effort
was to make the criminal recognize his utter worthlessness and to
bring him to the point of self-repudiation.49  Only then could the
criminal be directed onto the path toward regeneration, and only
then could the criminal make a sincere confession.50
44. For a discussion of the Puritan conception of Satan, see ANDREW DELBANCO, THE
DEATH OF SATAN: HOW AMERICANS HAVE LOST THE SENSE OF EVIL 42-55 (1995).  My
thanks to my colleague George Dent for alerting me to this source.
45. See id.
46. ROGERS, supra note 23, at 126.
47. See Williams, supra note 23, reprinted in REFORM, supra note 23, at 372.  As Williams
recognizes, these narratives, and the suggestion that they might serve as roadmaps toward con-
version, bore the strong taint of a “covenant of works,” a notion otherwise foreign to Puritan-
ism.  Id.  A number of condemned criminals read earlier criminal conversion narratives as part
of their preparation for conversion.  See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 23, at 70, 73.  As discussed
below, the intended audience for the conversion narratives was not merely the condemned, but
the society as a whole.
48. See Williams, supra note 23, reprinted in REFORM, supra note 23, at 376.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 377.
STRASSFELD 07/06/98  9:04 AM
1997] ART AND LAW OF CONFESSION 501
Not every confession was adequate.  Often the sincerity and
completeness of a late confession would remain in doubt.51  Puritan
ministers were quick to remind condemned criminals that while God
often makes great sinners exemplars of grace and salvation, “[l]ate
Repentance is seldom true.”52  Further, the confessor must not mini-
mize or excuse his act, or deny full responsibility for its conse-
quences.  Increase Mather warned two men convicted of the ax mur-
der of their master that so long as each offered only a partial
confession and continued to insist that the other dealt the fatal blow,
salvation would evade them.53
Nor did confession alone suffice.  The criminal had to exhibit
visible signs of saintliness.  In the words of one Massachusetts minis-
ter, Nathaniel Clapp, the condemned must “shew the Truth of Re-
pentance” through obedience and cooperation.54  In addition to con-
fession and an accompanying change of behavior, the criminal must
show a desire to glorify God by becoming a willing and penitent par-
ticipant in his own execution.55 He could fulfill this role by bearing
himself humbly and meekly in the face of his impending execution
and acknowledging the fitness of the punishment, while simultane-
ously looking with growing confidence towards the afterlife.56  Finally,
as part of the ritual of execution he must repent again in a last dying
speech delivered from the gallows, an event that was the culmination
of the penitent criminal’s efforts and preparations while in jail.57
These last words served multiple ends.  Once again the criminal con-
fessed his crime and accepted his punishment as just according to the
laws of man and God.  Additionally, his last dying speech served as a
warning to the assembled that sin and small acts of disobedience lead
51. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 23, at 49-54 (relating the confession of condemned mur-
derer James Morgan and the skepticism it engendered in the mind of Increase Mather).
52. Id. at 53 (quoting INCREASE MATHER, A SERMON OCCASIONED BY THE EXECUTION
OF A MAN FOUND GUILTY OF MURDER (2d ed. 1687)).
53. See Towner, supra note 23, at 530 (discussing INCREASE MATHER, THE WICKED
MAN’S PORTION (1675)).  For additional discussion of this case, see COHEN, supra note 23, at
47-48.
54. Williams, supra note 23, reprinted in REFORM, supra note 23, at 373.
55. See id. at 373-83.  Rodgers wrote, “I find a willingness in me to accept the punishment
of my sins and a readiness to glorify the Justice of God by suffering the Death I have de-
served.”  ROGERS, supra note 23, at 131; cf. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH:
THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 43 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) (stating that the ritual of execution
in early modern France made the guilty party act as “the herald of his own condemnation”).
56. See Williams, supra note 23, reprinted in REFORM, supra note 23, at 382.
57. See id. at 383.
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to graver sin and a tragic end, as exemplified by the criminal’s life
history.58
What were the meanings and effects of this enthusiasm for con-
fession, and for these ritualized confessional narratives and gallows
dramas?  For the individual, confession sometimes brought spiritual
comfort and an eased conscience.
It also facilitated sentencing mitigation before either an earthly
or a heavenly tribunal, depending on the nature and gravity of the
crime.  In noncapital cases, confession might lead to a lessening of the
sentence, on the theory that a confession indicated that the criminal’s
reformation was well under way if not complete.  Alternatively, pub-
lic confession might be the prescribed penalty, so that after a criminal
confessed, no penalty remained to be paid.  In either case, confession
helped to speed the wrongdoer’s reintegration into both the spiritual
and civil community.  In capital cases, however, confession had no ef-
fect on earthly justice.  Nor could Puritans hold, consistent with their
religious beliefs, that it could influence the heavenly judge.  Yet in
their execution sermons and in the conversion narratives that they
compiled, Puritan ministers indicated that a suitable confession and
last dying statement might be necessary not only to evidence saintli-
ness, but to remove an impediment to salvation.59
Further, by confessing, Esther Rodgers could become the hero-
ine of her life story.  For a young, troubled, and otherwise marginal
household servant such as Esther Rodgers, public confession brought
attention beyond anything she had previously experienced; similarly,
it generated an otherwise unobtainable outpouring of affection.  In
some sense her crime and punishment were “the best things that ever
happened to her,” as well as the worst.60
Public confession was obviously a social act with social meaning
and consequences in the sense that both the gallows speech and the
conversion narrative were directed toward an audience and crafted in
conformance to a variety of conventions expected by that audience.61
58. See Towner, supra note 23, at 534-35; Williams, supra note 23, reprinted in REFORM,
supra note 23, at 383-84.
59. See Towner, supra note 22, at 533-34.
60. The phrase and the insight come from my colleague, Spencer Neth.  Daniel Cohen
similarly notes: “In meeting the moral arbiters of the community on their own ground, the once
lowly servant and disgraced deviant had not merely salvaged her private sense of self-worth but
established a formidable public dignity as well.”  COHEN, supra note 23, at 64.
61. For a discussion of the degree to which the condemned were coached in how to act and
what to say, and of the role that ministers played in translating their accounts into standard lan-
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But these confessions were public in yet another sense: they de-
pended on an outpouring of community participation, most impor-
tantly by ministers, but also by laypeople, to bring the criminal to
penitence and possible salvation.  This is clear in the case of Esther
Rodgers, as a battery of ministers repeatedly engaged her in an effort
to redeem her.  Many of the church members of Ipswich joined in the
ministerial efforts as they took turns visiting her in prison and wel-
coming her into their homes for “whole days of Fasting and Prayer.”62
Why did the people of Ipswich struggle for and with Rodgers?
As Daniel Cohen notes, one reason was “communal chauvinism.”63
More important, however, was the sense of communal responsibility
for sin, a theme that Puritan ministers emphasized in execution ser-
mons.64  Coupled with the belief that “[t]he sin of one was the sin of
all,”65 there was a sense that little separated the condemned criminal’s
depravity from that of those who would witness his execution.  In
what Andrew Delbanco has aptly described as a “culture saturated
with the consciousness of sin,”66 this latter theme reverberated in
both the execution sermons and the condemneds’ confessions and
guage and form, see Williams, supra note 23, reprinted in REFORM, supra note 23, at 373-75 &
n.33.  Sometimes no amount of coaching would succeed.  In the case of the publicly unrepent-
ant Margaret Gaulacher, Cotton Mather went so far as to read an “instrument” he had ob-
tained from her in prison, but which she subsequently rejected, whose text followed the stan-
dards of gallows speeches.  See Lazenby, supra note 32, reprinted in REFORM, supra note 23, at
280.
62. COHEN, supra note 23, at 60-61, 64; see also id. at 44 (describing the efforts needed by
a minister to bring a criminal, in this instance an English Protestant, to repentance); Lazenby,
supra note 32, reprinted in REFORM, supra note 23, at 279-80 (describing visits by laypeople, in
addition to ministers, to read Scripture and other religious works to Margaret Gaulacher).
63. COHEN, supra note 23, at 64.  As Cohen notes, the narrative indicates that Rodgers’s
sinful life and crimes occurred in neighboring Newbury, but, unlike Ipswich, that community
was unable to bring her to repentance.  See id.
64. See HASKINS, supra note 38, at 93.  On the use of this theme in execution sermons, see
generally Ronald A. Bosco, Lectures at the Pillory: The Early American Execution Sermon, 30
AM. Q. 156 (1978), reprinted in REFORM, supra note 23, at 26, 32 (discussing the themes of de-
clension and the jeremiad form of these execution sermons).  The tone of these sermons is ex-
emplified by Samuel Danforth’s The Cry of Sodom Enquired into, in which he warned that
“The Church cannot be cleansed . . . [and] the Land cannot be Cleansed, until [they] hath spued
out this Unclean Beast.  The execution of Justice upon such a notorious Malefactor, is the
onely way to turn away the wrath of God from us, and to consecrate our selves to the Lord.”
Id. at 27 (quoting SAMUEL DANFORTH, THE CRY OF SODOM ENQUIRED INTO 8-9 (1674)).  But
see COHEN, supra note 23, at 49 (arguing that jeremiadic motifs of communal guilt and punish-
ment became less central by the late seventeenth century).
65. HASKINS, supra note 38, at 93.
66. DELBANCO, supra note 44, at 45.
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last dying speeches,67 and heightened the importance of the drama of
sin and repentance.  In a preface to Rogers’s book, Reverand William
Hubbard pointedly linked the judgment and sentence of Esther
Rodgers with the judgment and sentence of the “Great and General
Assembly that will appear at the Great Day to receive their final sen-
tence.”68
On the gallows, Esther Rodgers stood at once degraded and tri-
umphant.69 She had recounted the details of her shameful past with
abundant self-loathing, and the magistrates had judged her crimes so
heinous and so defiantly rebellious against God that her mortal exis-
tence could no longer be tolerated, lest the whole community suffer
God’s wrath for failing to cast her out.  Yet those who have left us a
record of Rodgers’s life and death reported that they and many of
those assembled to witness the event had little doubt that she was
among the elect chosen by God for salvation and glorious life ever-
lasting.  At once both condemned and saved, she was simultaneously
expelled from the community and embraced by it.  What did all of
this mean for those who had condemned her and those who came to
witness her last moments or who subsequently read Rogers’s account
of her life and death?  What role did Rodgers’s confession play in
constructing a social meaning for these events?
Through her confession, Rodgers condemned herself.  By con-
fessing and acknowledging that she merited her punishment perhaps
she eased the consciences of those charged with the duty either to
judge her or to carry out her execution.70  Indeed, she recounts that
67. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
68. ROGERS, supra note 23, at A2.
69. On the concept of degradation ceremonies, and on execution as one such ceremony,
see Harold Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 AM. J. SOC. 420
(1956).
70. On this function of confession, see FRANZ ALEXANDER & HUGO STAUB, THE
CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE, AND THE PUBLIC: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS  216 (Gregory Zil-
boorg trans., rev. ed. 1956); MIKE HEPWORTH & BRYAN S. TURNER, CONFESSION: STUDIES IN
DEVIANCE AND RELIGION 125 (1982) (citing LEON RADZINOWICZ, HISTORY OF ENGLISH
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750, at 348 (1968)); Louis Michael Seidman,
Rubashov’s Question: Self-Incrimination and the Problem of Coerced Preferences, 2 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 149, 167 (1990).  To be sure, Puritan society was not squeamish about capital pun-
ishment.  See COHEN, supra note 23, at 101-06 (discussing seventeenth and eighteenth century
justifications for capital punishment).  Nevertheless, Kai Erikson suggests that given Puritan
doctrines of predestination and the innate depravity of man, the emphasis on the criminal’s
confession and acceptance of the justice of his fate may have reflected a vague discomfort with
his punishment and a wish “for the condemned man to forgive them.”  KAI ERIKSON,
WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 195 (1966).
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she wanted to plead guilty at her trial, but was not permitted to be-
cause of the form of her indictment.  She was neither surprised nor
disappointed to be condemned to die.71
Additionally, her confession strengthened both religious and
civil authority within the state.  As Kai Erikson has noted, “[t]o re-
pent is to agree that the moral standards of the community are right
and that the sentence of the court is just.”72  By condemning her
crime and embracing her punishment she legitimized the state’s act
and the law under which she was condemned.  By restoring the con-
sensus regarding the wrongfulness of her act, Esther Rodgers defused
any possible challenges to that legitimacy.73  Hence, the conversion
narratives emphasized the willingness, and, in Rodgers’s case, the joy,
with which the condemned faced punishment.74  Her acceptance of
guidance from John Rogers and the other ministers, and her willing-
ness to follow their script for her last days, bolstered their authority,
as did the apparent soul-saving efficacy of the ministers’ efforts on
her behalf.75
71. See ROGERS, supra note 23, at 131-32.
72. ERIKSON, supra note 70, at 195.
73. See Seidman, supra note 70, at 167; Towner, supra note 23, at 536; cf. FOUCAULT, su-
pra note 55, at 38 (“‘It is not enough’ . . . ‘that wrong-doers be justly punished.  They must if
possible judge and condemn themselves.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting 1 P. AYRAULT,
L’ORDRE, FORMALITÉ, ET INSTRUCTION JUDICAIRE, pt. i, ch. 14)).  Contemporaneously the
English found that public executions sometimes provoked riots and challenges to authority on
behalf of the condemned.  For a discussion of the English experience in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, see generally Peter Linebaugh, The Tyburn Riot Against the Surgeons, in
ALBION’S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 65
(Douglas Hay et al. eds., 1975).
Stalin’s show trials of the 1930s are probably the most notorious example, but hardly the
only one, of the urge to legitimate prosecution and punishment by means of the condemned’s
confession, no matter the means used to obtain that confession.  For a discussion of these trials
and the importance of the defendants’ self-renunciations, see ISAAC DEUTSCHER, STALIN: A
POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 372-78 (2d ed. 1967).  For a fictional exploration of the dynamic be-
tween interrogator and prisoner during the Soviet purges of the 1930s, see ARTHUR
KOESTLER, DARKNESS AT NOON (1941); cf. L’AVEU [THE CONFESSION] (Les Films Corona
1970) (exploring similar themes in the setting of Czechoslovakia in the 1950s; directed by Kon-
stantin Costa-Gavras).
74. See COHEN, supra note 23, at 62-63 (describing how Rodgers’s ecstasy increased as she
approached her punishment); Williams, supra note 23, reprinted in REFORM, supra note 23, at
382-83.  Rodgers stated on the day of her execution, “I many times have endeavoured to terrify
myself with the thought of Death and my Execution; it seems rather a matter of comfort than
terror to me.”  ROGERS, supra note 23, at 142.  One convicted murderer, Hugh Stone, stated
that he would insist on his execution should there be any sentiment for lessening his punish-
ment.  See Towner, supra note 23, at 536.
75. Indeed, some criminals reportedly specified the minister whom they wished to have
preach their execution sermon, which could only enhance the minister’s reputation, as did the
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What Rodgers did not say in her confessions was as important as
what she said.  Like many of the other criminals featured in colonial
New England’s criminal conversion literature, Rodgers came from
the margins of society, and like so many of them, her crime was kill-
ing her illegitimate children.76  She might have told a story about
temptation, seduction, and betrayal; about her isolation as a teenage
apprentice in another person’s household and her feelings of power-
lessness when confronted with unwanted pregnancies.  Her story
might have confronted Puritan society with questions about the lot of
poor young women and other relative outsiders in New England.77
Such potential challenges to the assumptions of Puritan society re-
main unspoken in this literature.
Rodgers’s confession further strengthened governing authority
by tracing the genesis of her crime to smaller sins and crimes of diso-
bedience.  Crime, Emile Durkheim long ago argued, performs the so-
cial function of demarcating collective norms and creating greater so-
cial solidarity around those norms.78  Rodgers’s confession did more
than simply marshal the “public temper” against infanticide, how-
ever.  Typical of other contemporary criminal conversion narratives,
Rodgers attributed the awful climax of her sinful behavior to more
mundane sins of Sabbath-breaking, keeping company with wicked
companions, and “running out” at night.79  These were sins that many
opportunity to preach before the large crowd that public executions drew.  See COHEN, supra
note 23, at 6; see also Lazenby, supra note 32, reprinted in REFORM, supra note 23, at 276
(noting that Cotton Mather became a “best-selling” author by preserving and publishing ser-
mons to murderers as well as their case histories).
76. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
77. Other criminals who appear prominently in this literature describing their experiences
of marginality include a converted Indian, a servant, and a runaway slave.  See COHEN, supra
note 23, at 69-79.
78. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 100-03 (George Simpson
trans., 1933).  Durkheim writes of this social function of crime, this capacity to create collective
outrage:
Everybody is attacked; consequently, everybody opposes the attack.  Not only is the
reaction general, but it is collective . . . . It is not produced isolatedly in each one, but
with a totality and a unity . . . . Crime brings together upright consciences and con-
centrates them.  We have only to notice what happens, particularly in a small town,
when some moral scandal has just been committed.  They stop each other on the
street, they visit each other, they seek to come together to talk of the event and to
wax indignant in common.  From all the similar impressions which are exchanged,
from all the temper that gets itself expressed, there emerges a unique temper . . .
which is everybody’s without being anybody’s in particular.  That is the public tem-
per.
Id. at 102.
79. See ROGERS, supra note 23, at 123.
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in her audience could recognize in their own behavior.  Thus Rodgers
stood as an affirmation of the civil and religious authorities’ warnings
about the wages of sin and as a vivid example of a fate that could
easily be theirs.80  Indeed, as Lawrence Towner has explained, the
lives of crime recounted in the conversion narratives “[a]lmost in-
variably” trace their genesis to the violation of the Fifth Command-
ment’s prescription to honor one’s father and mother.81  The lessons
of these narratives: disobedience to parents, masters, or other rightful
authority led to the gallows and damnation.
Yet confession brought about a different sort of social solidarity
than that conceptualized by Durkheim as a response to crime.  The
execution sermons, confessions, and dying speeches obscured rather
than highlighted the demarcation between the condemned and the
community.  Each emphasized that the audience differed little from
the condemned and risked replicating her fate.  Rather than creating
a solidarity in opposition to the criminal, the confession forged a col-
lective solidarity that enveloped the condemned and returned her to
the community.  The drama of Esther Rodgers’s sin and conversion
stood synecdochically for the peril faced by the Puritan community
and each of its members.  Little wonder, then, the enormous effort
undertaken by the community on her behalf.  The elaborate efforts to
induce confession and the rituals of execution constituted a ceremony
of inclusion and reintegration.82  By restoring the consensus regarding
the wrongfulness of her act, Rodgers “move[d] back into the commu-
nity as a witness to h[er] own execution.”83  By her conversion, Rodg-
ers joined the community of saints.
B.  Acceptance of Criminal Responsibility
By century’s end Americans held more ambivalent attitudes to-
ward confession.  The rituals of execution, execution sermons, and
dying speeches had changed little from those of Puritan New Eng-
80. See Towner, supra note 23, at 534-37.  In their execution sermons and other sermons to
the condemned, the ministry took pains to reinforce the message for the community that little
separated them from the condemned and that lesser sins were the seedbeds of greater ones.
See Bosco, supra note 64, at 35-36; see also Lazenby, supra note 32, reprinted in REFORM, supra
note 23, at 278 (describing Cotton Mather’s sermons encouraging quick repentence for any sin
lest the pain of unrepented-for sins aggregate to form the torture of eternal damnation).
81. See Towner, supra note 23, at 534-35.
82. For a discussion of confession as a ceremony of inclusion, see HEPWORTH & TURNER,
supra note 70, at 14, 22-23, 37, 43-44, 129-30, 132 and passim.
83. ERIKSON, supra note 70, at 195.
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land.84  Ministers continued to dispense messages of warning and
hope through the publication of criminal conversion narratives, al-
though these narratives now competed with newspapers and other
publications that offered secular accounts of executions.85  These rites
and texts continued to have social consequences similar to those they
had engendered earlier in the century.86  They bolstered the authority
of civil and religious authorities and legitimated the state’s admini-
stration of punishment,87 while they concurrently rehumanized the
criminal.88  Yet accompanying the then-emergent sentiment favoring
the abolishment of capital punishment came a renewed skepticism
regarding conversions accomplished in the shadows of the gallows.
Opponents of capital punishment argued that death cut short the
process of reformation, which could be accomplished more effec-
tively, and with less artificial pressure, in a penitentiary.  Instead,
they argued, capital punishment encouraged inauthentic conversion
“spectacles.”89
In the wake of the American Revolution and well into the nine-
teenth century, courts appear to have been wary of confessions, and,
indeed, of guilty pleas of any kind, plea bargained or otherwise.  His-
torians of criminal justice have found almost no evidence of plea bar-
gaining during this period, leading to the conclusion that plea bar-
gains were rarely made.90  Indeed, they have found that the rate of
84. See LOUIS P. MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1776-1865, at 39 (1989).  Masur notes that
“Increase and Cotton Mather would have felt at ease with the sermons and confessions deliv-
ered at the gallows in the last quarter of the eighteenth century.”  Id. at 40.  But see COHEN,
supra note 23, at 89-100 (discussing the growing tendency during this period to talk not only
about man’s fallen nature and depravity, but also about environmental causes of crime).
85. Cf. MASUR, supra note 84, at 33 (noting that sermons were but one part of the execu-
tion day ritual).  Masur also notes that ministers sometimes shared with civil authorities the
role of producing conversion narratives.  See id. at 34.  For a discussion of the growing secular
literature relating to crime and its punishment, see COHEN, supra note 23, at 24-32.
86. See MASUR, supra note 84, at 26.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 34-36 (discussing the effect of prisoners’ last words of dying confessions).
89. MASUR, supra note 84, at 105-09 (describing the growing concern with the possibilty of
false confessions).  The characterization of public ritualized executions as “not fit spectacles for
the public gaze,” was the Reverend Francis Parkman’s.  Id. at 109.
90. See THEODORE FERDINAND, BOSTON’S LOWER CRIMINAL COURTS, 1814-1850, at 49
(1992); see also, e.g., ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PHILADELPHIA, 1800-1880, at 230-31 (1989) (noting that plea bargaining, in contrast to private
settlement, which occurred under Philadelphia’s system of private prosecution during the first
half of the nineteenth century, emerged with the displacement of private prosecution by a
criminal justice system built around professional police and prosecutors); Albert W. Alschuler,
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guilty pleas (which, of course, are only sometimes the product of bar-
gaining) was quite low in the early years of the Republic.91  Moreover,
what little evidence exists suggests that courts may have actively dis-
suaded guilty pleas.92  In 1804 Massachusetts was quite possibly still
the state where the confessionary impulse was most robust.  Yet that
impulse was apparently tempered by the civil libertarian heritage of
the Revolution, and in the only reported case on the subject, a Mas-
sachusetts trial court placed several obstacles before a defendant who
sought to plead guilty to charges of rape and murder.93  The court first
explained to the defendant the consequences of his plea, “that he was
under no legal or moral obligation to plead guilty,” and that he was
entitled to put the state to its proof against him.94  When the defen-
dant remained adamant about his guilty plea, the court remanded
him to his cell to reconsider and instructed the clerk not to record his
plea.95  When he returned to court, the defendant remained insistent
about his guilty plea.96  The court accepted the plea, but only after ex-
Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1979) (arguing that plea bargaining
was rare until the mid-nineteenth century); Lawrence M. Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Histori-
cal Perspective, 13 L. & SOC’Y REV. 247, 249 (1979) (examining the rise of plea bargaining in
Alameda county after 1880); Mark H. Haller, Plea Bargaining: The Nineteenth Century Con-
text, 13 L. & SOC’Y REV. 273, 275 (1979) (tying the increased use of plea bargaining to the de-
velopment of urban police departments in the late nineteenth century); John H. Langbein, Un-
derstanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 L. & SOC’Y REV. 261, 266 (1979)
(explaining the expanded use of plea bargaining by the increasingly busy and lawyer-
dominated trial practice of the nineteenth century).  For a somewhat different view, see Jay
Wishingrad, The Plea Bargain in Historical Perspective, 23 BUFF. L. REV. 499, 512-24 (1974)
(arguing that despite some appellate decisions rejecting plea bargaining, tacit and explicit plea
bargaining was part of the American criminal justice system from its origins).  Even Wishin-
grad, however, finds no American decision that explicitly or tacitly approved of plea bargaining
before the 1860s.  See id.  For criticism of Wishingrad’s study, see Friedman, supra, at 247
(calling Wishingrad’s study a “skimpy collection of cases,” many of which were not about plea
bargaining).
91. See STEINBERG, supra note 90, at 66, 75 (remarking on the lack of systematic guilty
pleas in assault and battery and larceny cases prior to 1838, around which time a preference in
sentencing for guilty pleas developed); see also Alschuler, supra note 90, at 12 (noting guilty
pleas made up only 11-25% of pleas in several courts in the early nineteenth century).  One
finds a similar pattern in British courts at this time.  See George Fisher, The Birth of the Prison
Retold, 104 YALE L.J. 1235, 1275 & n.197 (1995) (noting that in one study of Surrey courts in
the eighteenth century, guilty pleas comprised less than 5% of all pleas in petty larceny cases).
92. See Alschuler, supra note 90, at 12.  In this regard, American courts followed the Eng-
lish common law tradition.  See id. at 9-11; see also Langbein, supra note 90, at 305-06.
93. See Commonwealth v. Battis, 1 Mass. (1 Will.) 94, 95 (1804).  Both Alschuler, supra
note 90, at 11-12, and Wishingrad, supra note 90, at 514-15, discuss this case.
94. Battis, 1 Mass. (1 Will.) at 95.
95. See id.
96. See id.
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amining under oath the sheriff, jailer, and the justice who had con-
ducted the preliminary examination of the defendant to ensure that
the prisoner was sane, and that his guilty plea had not been induced
by any “promises, persuasions, or hopes of pardon.”97
While courts in the young republic may have regarded guilty
pleas suspiciously, even to the point of questioning the sanity of a de-
fendant who would relinquish his constitutional right to make the
state prove his guilt to a jury, there is also some evidence that at sen-
tencing, these courts favored defendants who had pled guilty.98  Fa-
vorable sentencing treatment of those who pled guilty probably re-
flected a belief that those who accepted responsibility for their crimes
had begun the reformation process, which they could be expected to
complete more quickly than those who shunned responsibility for
their crimes.99  Perhaps it also reflected the belief that the genuinely
remorseful criminal was more deserving of leniency and, posing less
of a threat to society, was less in need of incapacitation.
The American criminal justice system became increasingly mod-
ern during the nineteenth century with the establishment of profes-
sional police forces and the emergence of professional district attor-
neys to supplant a system of private prosecutions.  This modern-
ization increased the incidence of plea bargaining.100  As this practice
gradually gained increased acceptance, docket management and
97. Id.  The clear implication of the court’s language was that it would not have accepted a
guilty plea that was the product of bargaining or of any other sort of inducement.  Only when it
satisfied itself that the plea had not been induced by third parties, did the court accept the plea.
See Alschuler, supra note 90, at 11-12; Wishingrad, supra note 90, at 514-15.
98. Allen Steinberg has found that in Philadelphia’s criminal courts in the 1840s and 1850s,
defendants pleading guilty to charges of assault and battery or larceny received a considerable
sentencing advantage over their counterparts who were convicted after pleading not guilty.  See
STEINBERG, supra note 90, at 66, 67 n.26, 75-76.  Theodore Ferdinand, however, has not found
comparable results in Boston courts, absent a plea bargain, although he speculates that many
defendants may have pled guilty with the expectation, or at least hope, of receiving some sen-
tencing benefit.  See FERDINAND, supra note 90, at 53.  George Fisher has found similar leni-
ency in late eighteenth century England for defendants who pled guilty.  See Fisher, supra note
91, at 1276.  In the records he studied, half of those convicted of larceny after trial were sen-
tenced to transportation to America or Australia, while none of those who pled guilty were sen-
tenced to transportation.  See id.  Alschuler and others describe this practice of “sentencing
defendants who plead guilty less severely than defendants who are convicted at jury trials” as
implicit plea bargaining.  Albert W. Alschuler, Departures and Plea Agreements Under the
Sentencing Guidelines, 117 F.R.D. 459, 471 (1988) [hereinafter Alschuler, Departures and Plea
Agreements].
99. For an example in the British context, see Fisher, supra note 91, at 1276.
100. See FERDINAND, supra note 90, at 53-98; STEINBERG, supra note 90, at 230-31; Haller,
supra note 90, at 189-93.
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quick disposition of cases joined with the beliefs that penitence
marked the beginning of rehabilitation and that the penitent defen-
dant deserved leniency as rationales supporting favorable treatment
for defendants who plead guilty.  Studies of sentencing practices in
the more recent past have shown that judges continue to reward ap-
parently contrite defendants, and especially those who plead guilty,
with sentence leniency.101  A survey conducted in the 1950s of 140 of
the then 240 federal district court judges, as well as nine of Connecti-
cut’s twenty superior court judges, revealed that most responding
judges rewarded guilty pleas with sentence leniency.102  The judges
typically justified their practice by asserting that defendants who pled
guilty manifested a repentant attitude, which was “an important step
toward rehabilitation.”103  Yet nearly as many judges acknowledged
that sentence leniency was also a reward for defendants whose guilty
pleas spared the government the expense of trial and had helped to
clear crowded court dockets.104  More recent interviews with judges
regarding sentencing practices for white-collar crimes established
that contrition and cooperation remained important factors in the de-
termination of sentences and that judges looked beyond the plea to
consider the authenticity and extent of contrition and the degree and
value of assistance offered to the prosecutor.105
101. See MODEL SENTENCING ACT § 1.8(a)(ii) (National Council on Crime & Delinquency,
2d ed. 1972), reprinted in GEORGE H. REVELLE, SENTENCING AND PROBATION 214-17 (1973);
see also, e.g., STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-
COLLAR CRIMINALS 115-20 (1988) (recounting stories of judges who were moved by defen-
dants’ remorse and cooperation); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON
THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 48 (1987) [hereinafter U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT] (noting that “cases in which guilty pleas are
entered result on average in considerably lower sentences”).
102. See Note, The Influence of the Defendant’s Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence,
66 YALE L.J. 204, 206-07 (1956) [hereinafter Yale Survey] (noting that of the 140 district court
judges who responded, 66% considered the defendant’s plea to be relevant in sentencing and,
of those 66% of judges, 87% indicated that a guilty plea results in a more lenient sentence.  The
Note further indicated that of the nine state judges who responded, eight considered the defen-
dant’s plea to be germane to sentencing).
103. Id. at 209-10.
104. See id. at 219-20.
105. See WHEELER ET AL., supra note 101, at 115-20.  While the earlier survey was framed
in such a way as to focus on the defendant’s plea, there’s little reason to believe that the par-
ticipating judges were any less likely than those questioned in the white-collar sentencing study
to attempt to discriminate between real and feigned repentance.  Indeed, the respondents to
the Yale study noted that a guilty plea was only one of the many factors that they took into
consideration, and that its weight varied from case to case.  See Yale Survey, supra note 100, at
207 n.19.
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This practice of rewarding remorseful defendants has been for-
malized and, to some extent, regularized in the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (the Guidelines).  The Guidelines were promulgated by
the United States Sentencing Commission and given the force of law
pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.106  Under the Guide-
lines, federal district courts plot the defendant’s offense level on the
vertical axis and his “criminal history points” on the horizontal axis;
the resulting coordinates establish a sentencing range.107  As part of
the process of determining the defendant’s offense level the sen-
tencing judge considers whether or not the defendant has accepted
responsibility for his offense.  Guidelines Section 3E1.1(a) instructs,
“If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility
for his offense, decrease the offense level by 2 levels.”108  Under the
Guidelines a two-step reduction in offense level may make a signifi-
cant difference in the defendant’s sentence.109  For example, a defen-
dant convicted of armed bank robbery would, absent other enhance-
ments or reductions, have an offense level of 25.110  If the bank robber
had no prior criminal history, the Guidelines prescribe a sentence of
106. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 235(a)(1), 98 Stat. 1987,
2031-33 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1994)).
107. Jon M. Sands & Cynthia A. Coates, The Mikado’s Object: The Tension Between Rele-
vant Conduct and Acceptance of Responsibility in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 23 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 61, 64-65 (1991).  The process by which a sentencing judge must determine the appro-
priate offense level and criminal history points is far more complicated than the single sentence
in the text suggests, but most of the intricacies of the Guidelines, other than the Guidelines’
downward adjustment for “acceptance of responsibility,” are beyond the scope of this Article.
For discussions of the Guidelines generally and of many of its intricacies, see ROGER W.
HAINES, JR. ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK (1994); THOMAS W.
HUTCHINSON ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1994).
108. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(a) (1995) [hereinafter
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL].  Subsection (b) of Section 3E1.1 provides for an addi-
tional reduction of one offense level for any defendant who qualifies for a decrease under sub-
section (a), whose offense level is sixteen or greater and who has assisted authorities in the in-
vestigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by either: timely providing the government
with complete information concerning his involvement in the offense, or timely notifying the
authorities of his intention to plead guilty, thereby avoiding any preparation for a trial and
saving prosecutorial and judicial resources.  See id. § 3E1.1(b).
109. Generally the sentence discount will not be as big as the discount that a defendant
would have garnered by offering a guilty plea in pre-Guideline days.  According to the Sen-
tencing Commission’s study of then-current federal sentencing practices, the average sentence
for someone who pled guilty was from 30 to 40% below that which a defendant convicted of the
same crime after a trial would receive.  Under the Guidelines the two-level reduction produces
a sentence reduction of approximately 20%.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SUPPLE-
MENTARY REPORT, supra note 101, at 48-50; Alschuler, Departures and Plea Agreements, supra
note 98, at 471.
110. See United States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 652 (3d Cir. 1991).
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between 57 and 71 months, but a two-step reduction for acceptance
of responsibility would reduce the sentence range to 46 to 57
months.111
The availability of reduced sentences for those who accept re-
sponsibility, and the courts’ considerable readiness to grant these re-
ductions despite the overall stringency of the Guidelines, ensure that
confessions remain commonplace in America.112  Nevertheless, al-
though most criminal defendants who seek a downward adjustment
for acceptance of responsibility receive the adjustment, not every
criminal defendant qualifies.  An examination of decisions distin-
guishing deduction-worthy from unworthy, inauthentic contrition re-
veals much about modern norms and expectations regarding confes-
sion.
Guidelines Section 3E1.1(a) offers little guidance for the sen-
tencing judge other than to indicate that the burden is on the defen-
dant to demonstrate “clearly” his acceptance of responsibility.113  The
accompanying application notes provide greater guidance, although,
as note 5 indicates, the decision whether or not a defendant’s accep-
tance of responsibility is authentic and adequate falls largely to the
discretion of the sentencing judge.114  The notes indicate certain cir-
cumstances that will preclude or strongly militate against an adjust-
ment.  The Guidelines presuppose that in most instances the defen-
111. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 108, § 5A (sentencing table).
112. In 1995, 86.7% of all offenders received the acceptance of responsibility downward
adjustment. See Phyllis J. Newton et al., Gender, Individuality and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 8 FED. SENT. REP. 148, 150 (1995).  A survey conducted by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in 1990 found that the downward adjustment for acceptance
of responsibility was granted in 80% of cases where the defendant pleaded guilty.  See United
States v. Knight, 905 F.2d 189, 192, 194-95 (8th Cir. 1990).  The other downward adjustments
available under the Guidelines are for the defendant’s “mitigating role” in the offense as a
“minimal” or “minor” participant in the criminal activity, SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL,
supra note 108, § 3B1.2, and for the defendant’s “super” acceptance of responsibility by
“assist[ing] authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct.”  Id. §
3E1.1(b).
113. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 108, § 3E1.1(a).
114. See id. § 3E1.1 application note 5.  Courts of appeals have consistently applied a defer-
ential standard of review with regard to the sentencing judge’s evaluation of the authenticity
and completeness of the defendant’s contrition, under which the decision to grant or withhold
the adjustment will only be set aside if clearly erroneous or without foundation.  See, e.g.,
United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 594 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 263 (1996); United
States v. Dvorak, 41 F.3d 1215, 1216 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Morillo, 8 F.3d 864, 871
(1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Furlow, 980 F.2d 476, 476 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Ca-
margo, 908 F.2d 179, 185 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Smith, 905 F.2d 1296, 1301 (9th Cir.
1990); United States v. Thomas, 870 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1989).
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dant who seeks an adjustment will have pled guilty, and note 2 states
that a defendant who denies factual elements of guilt, and only ad-
mits guilt and expresses remorse after conviction, is ineligible for an
acceptance of responsibility adjustment.115  Not surprisingly, the
Commissioners similarly found behavior that would merit sentence
enhancement for obstructing or impeding justice to be generally in-
consistent with acceptance of  responsibility.116
Generally, entry of a guilty plea before trial and truthful admis-
sion of the conduct comprising the offense of conviction strongly in-
dicate an acceptance of responsibility, but these two factors do not
entitle the defendant to an adjustment as a matter of right; they may
be outweighed by other evidence of a failure to accept responsibil-
ity.117  The notes also identify a number of factors that, while not nec-
essarily dispositive either alone or in combination, nonetheless point
toward a finding of acceptance of responsibility.  Note 1 describes es-
sentially three categories of behavior that militate in favor of an ad-
justment for acceptance of responsibility, especially if the defendant
has acted in a timely manner: 1) truthful confession and other acts to
assist authorities; 2) acts to stop the criminal conduct or to undo its
consequences; and 3) acts to ensure against future misconduct.118  An
115. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 108, § 3E1.1 application note 2.
The note adds, however, that there may be rare instances in which the defendant can manifest
acceptance of responsibility despite a conviction at trial where the defendant had gone to trial
to assert issues unrelated to his factual guilt, such as the constitutionality of the statute in ques-
tion or the applicability of a statute to his conduct.  See id.  Even in these instances, however,
the Commissioners cautioned against late conversion by stating that the determination of
whether the defendant merited the adjustment should be based primarily on his pre-trial state-
ments and deeds.  See id.
116. See id. § 3E1.1 application note 3.  The enhancement for obstructing or impeding jus-
tice is found in Section 3C1.1 of the Guidelines.  The Guidelines originally stated that the
downward adjustment would not be available whenever a defendant “perjures himself, suborns
perjury, or otherwise obstructs the trial or the administration of justice.” Id. app. C, amend.
258.  A 1989 amendment permits the adjustment in “extraordinary cases in which adjustments
under both §§ 3C1.1 and 3E1.1 may apply.”  Id.
117. See id. § 3E1.1 application note 3.
118. Application note 1 states:
In determining whether a defendant qualifies under subsection (a), appropriate con-
siderations include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense(s) of conviction, and
truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any additional relevant conduct for which
the defendant is accountable under sec. 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct). . . .
(b) voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or associations;
(c) voluntary payment of restitution prior to adjudication of guilt;
(d) voluntary surrender to authorities promptly after commission of the offense;
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examination of the case law applying Section 3E1.1(a) gives a more
complete picture of what it takes to make a meaningful and accept-
able confession today.
In some instances the defendant’s words or deeds clearly belie
his or her assertions of remorse and acceptance of responsibility.
Courts have denied the adjustment to defendants who: 1) continue to
commit related crimes either after arrest from jail or while on re-
lease;119 2) flee after arrest or conviction;120 3) destroy evidence or
otherwise obstruct justice;121 4) attempt to withdraw their guilty plea
and assert their innocence;122 5) retain a portion of the property they
have stolen;123 or 6) lie to their probation officer about assets avail-
(e) voluntary assistance to authorities in the recovery of the fruits and instrumentali-
ties of the offense;
(f) voluntary resignation from the office or position held during the commission of
the offense;
(g) post-offense rehabilitative efforts (e.g. counseling or drug treatment); and
(h) the timeliness of the defendant’s conduct in manifesting the acceptance of re-
sponsibility.
Id. § 3E1.1 application note 1.
119. See, e.g., United States v. Carrington, 96 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 1328 (1997) (denying adjustment in part because defendant continued crimes on release);
United States v. Snyder, 913 F.2d 300, 301-02 (6th Cir. 1990) (denying adjustment to an incar-
cerated defendant who used a telephone to discuss the purchase of cocaine and was charged
with conspiracy to possess cocaine for distribution); United States v. Wivell, 893 F.2d 156, 159
(8th Cir. 1990) (denying adjustment to defendant who continued to deal in cocaine after release
on bond); United States v. Jordan, 890 F.2d 968, 974 (7th Cir. 1989) (denying adjustment to
defendant who continued to deal in cocaine while on bail awaiting sentencing).  But see United
States v. Morrison, 983 F.2d 730, 735 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that post-arrest misconduct un-
related to and dissimilar from charged offense need not be grounds for denial of adjustment).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Hawley, 93 F.3d 682, 689-90 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 1458 (1997) (holding that escape or violation of an appearance bond is evidence of
failure to accept responsibility and thus a court can withhold a reduction); United States v.
Shinder, 8 F.3d 633, 635 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that flight after conviction and prior to sen-
tencing was sufficient ground to deny the reduction for acceptance of responsibility).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Yusuff, 96 F.3d 982, 988-89 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 999 (1997) (stating that lying at suppression hearing justified the refusal to grant a reduc-
tion); United States v. Edwards, 911 F.2d 1031, 1034 (5th Cir. 1990) (determining that a defen-
dant’s failure to notify authorities of a suspect’s whereabouts constituted obstruction of justice).
But see United States v. Lallemand, 989 F.2d 936, 938 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that it was ap-
propriate to adjust for acceptance of responsibility even though the court also found obstruc-
tion of justice).
122. See United States v. Knight, 96 F.3d 307, 310 (8th Cir. 1996) (affirming a district court
finding that a defendant who moved to withdraw a guilty plea was not “accepting responsibil-
ity” for his actions and therefore did not qualify for sentence reduction).
123. See United States v. Voyles, 995 F.2d 91, 94 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding a defendant’s fail-
ure to return a portion of stolen property to be a valid consideration in deciding not to reduce a
sentence).
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able for restitution.124  Courts have been mindful of the possibility
that a defendant who has “retain[ed] a lawyer who can help him craft
a spiel,”125 or who otherwise knows how to navigate the sentencing
process, will obtain a reduction simply by “incanting the appropriate
litany of remorse.”126  Often, a sentencing judge has relied on defen-
dant demeanor or other indications that the defendant is not sin-
cerely remorseful.127  In many of these cases the old saw that “late re-
pentance is seldom true,”128 seems to resonate strongly with sen-
tencing judges; but unlike their Puritan counterparts, modern judges
seem to demand that repentance be almost contemporaneous with
the crime, rather than the product of a protracted communal strug-
gle.129
The acceptance of responsibility decisions illustrate that a de-
fendant’s assertions of remorse must be not only credible, but they
must also be total, unqualified acknowledgments of personal failure
and fault.  The defendant will not receive a downward adjustment if
she expresses her remorse selectively or attempts to minimize her
role in the crime.  For example, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit affirmed a sentencing decision withholding an
adjustment from a defendant who said he was sorry that he had
124. See United States v. Larsen, 909 F.2d 1047, 1050 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that intention-
ally lying to a probation officer about the amount of money available for restitution is a valid
ground for finding that the defendant obstructed justice).
125. United States v. Beserra, 967 F.2d 254, 256 (7th Cir. 1992).
126. United States v. Speck, 992 F.2d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 1993).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 952 F.2d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 1991) (approving district
court’s disbelief of defendant’s professions of remorse); United States v. Cruz, 946 F.2d 122,
126 (11th Cir. 1991) (approving district court’s denial of adjustment, despite a guilty plea, be-
cause the sentencing judge concluded that defendant “seems to be taking this in a rather light
fashion today”); United States v. Camargo, 908 F.2d 179, 185 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming denial
of adjustment where the sentencing judge disbelieved sincerity of defendant’s apology).
128. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Wichmann, 958 F.2d 240, 242 (8th Cir. 1992) (denying ad-
justment where defendant initially failed to appear at trial, though he subsequently pled guilty);
United States v. Apple, 915 F.2d 899, 913 (4th Cir. 1990) (denying adjustment where defendant
pled guilty only after his wife was convicted in separate trial and his own trial was imminent);
United States v. Casal, 915 F.2d 1225, 1230 (8th Cir. 1990) (denying adjustment where defen-
dant evaded arrest, but confessed once arrested); United States v. Carroll, 893 F.2d 1502, 1511-
12 (6th Cir. 1990) (denying adjustment to defendant who waived indictment and pled guilty
within two weeks of initial appearance on the complaint because “guilty plea in the face of al-
most certain conviction” does not signal genuine contrition); United States v. Rios, 893 F.2d
479, 480-81 (2d Cir. 1990) (denying adjustment where defendant waited until just before jury
selection to plead guilty).  But see United States v. Hill, 953 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding
that district court’s granting of adjustment based on defendant’s “11th hour” repentance was
not clearly erroneous).
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cheated individuals and small companies, but that “he felt no re-
morse over cheating large businesses.”130  Defendants who have ac-
knowledged only a portion of their wrongdoing, or who have refused
to admit every element of the offense of conviction, have generally
failed to win the adjustment.131  Similarly, defendants who admit re-
sponsibility but then understate either their role in the criminal en-
terprise or the gravity of their conduct have not received the adjust-
ment.132
Finally, sentencing judges have shown little patience with any-
thing short of an unqualified acceptance of personal responsibility.
Unlike seventeenth century conversion narratives, where a recitation
of the genesis of the condemned’s sinfulness, complete with a discus-
sion of the bad habits and bad company that the condemned had
fallen prey to, was expected, modern statements by defendants who
offer too much explanation of the sources of their misconduct are
likely to be regarded by judges as attempts to evade responsibility.
130. United States v. Whitehead, 912 F.2d 448, 450-51 (10th Cir. 1990); cf. United States v.
McAlpine, 32 F.3d 484, 485, 490 (10th Cir. 1994) (approving denial of adjustment to defendant
who pled guilty to eight counts of mail fraud arising out of sales of interests in oil and gas leases
and properties, where defendant characterized investors as sophisticated and investments as
risky).
131. See, e.g., McAlpine, 32 F.3d at 485, 490 (refusing adjustment to defendant convicted of
mail fraud in sales of interests in oil and gas leases and properties, where the defendant’s ad-
mission of fraud was limited to statement that the oil fields were inefficiently run and his ac-
counting techniques were shoddy); United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 820 (7th Cir. 1994)
(affirming a decision to deny adjustment when defendant “accepted responsibility only for little
more than half of the conduct for which he was convicted and sentenced”); United States v.
Buss, 928 F.2d 150, 151-52 (5th Cir. 1991) (denying adjustment where defendant denied know-
ing that it was illegal for an ex-felon to posses a weapon); United States v. Head, 927 F.2d 1361,
1374 (6th Cir. 1991) (agreeing with district court that defendant’s admission that he possessed
cocaine base is inadequate under Section 3E1.1, where defendant is charged with and convicted
of possession with intent to distribute); United States v. Sloman, 909 F.2d 176, 182 (6th Cir.
1990) (refusing adjustment where defendant expressed regrets over results of his conduct, but
never admitted having a fraudulent intent).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Dvorak, 41 F.3d 1215, 1217 (7th Cir. 1994) (approving the
district court’s denial of adjustment for defendant who pleaded guilty to two counts of accept-
ing bribes where sentencing judge found that defendant “rationalized his crimes as technicali-
ties” in claiming that he would have done political favors for the people who gave him gifts
even without the gifts); United States v. Mabry, 3 F.3d 244, 250 (8th Cir. 1993) (denying a re-
duction where the defendant tried to minimize his role in conspiracy and told the presentence
investigator that “I’m a small-time hustler, not this”); United States v. Chalkias, 971 F.2d 1206,
1217 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that court may withhold adjustment where the defendant under-
stated her role in a drug conspiracy); United States v. Shipley, 963 F.2d 56, 58-60 (5th Cir.
1992) (approving refusal of adjustment where defendant admitted to crime but denied leader-
ship role); United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 664, 669 (6th Cir. 1990) (denying adjustment where
the defendant failed to acknowledge leadership role in criminal undertaking).
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Suggestions that others share responsibility or attempts to explain,
and thereby partly to excuse, a defendant’s conduct have met a chilly
judicial reception.133 Even attempts at self-improvement that address
sources of the criminal conduct—alcoholism or drug addiction—
without a proper measure of self-denunciation may not yield an ac-
ceptance of responsibility adjustment.134
Defenses asserted by defendants that do not deny the charged
conduct but otherwise deny legal responsibility also tend to under-
mine defendants’ claims to have accepted responsibility.  Typically,
courts have regarded the entrapment defense as an effort to shift
blame onto someone else, and thus the “antithesis of the acceptance
of responsibility.”135  Defenses that assert a lack of mens rea have
proven particularly troublesome.  One defendant who relied on an
133. See, e.g., McAlpine, 32 F.3d at 490 (refusing adjustment where defendant diminished
his own fault and attempted to shift blame to others); United States v. Speck, 992 F.2d 860, 863
(8th Cir. 1993) (refusing adjustment where defendant maintained his innocence and blamed
others); United States v. Reno, 992 F.2d 739, 744-45 (7th Cir. 1993) (denying adjustment where
defendant attributed criminal behavior to alcoholism and bad companions); United States v.
Shores, 966 F.2d 1383, 1388 (11th Cir. 1992) (refusing adjustment where defendant “continued
to blame his involvement on others”); United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1127-28 (3d Cir.
1991) (refusing adjustment where defendant attributed criminal behavior to drug abuse and
bad companions); United States v. Baker, 907 F.2d 53, 55 n.2 (8th Cir. 1990) (refusing adjust-
ment where defendant stated that drug dealing was the only way she could support her chil-
dren).
134. See United States v. Curran, 967 F.2d 5, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1992) (vacating and remanding,
however, because of uncertainty about the district court’s reasons for denying adjustment);
United States v. Pharr, 916 F.2d 129, 131-32 (3d Cir. 1990) (reversing and remanding on other
grounds and failing to reach the issue).  But see United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326, 1330
(8th Cir. 1990) (granting adjustment to defendant who acknowledged that drinking led to his
loss of control and that he was responsible and sorry for the results and wished to refrain from
future alcohol use despite statement that he was too drunk to remember the assault and
doubted that he intended it).  A 1992 amendment added application note 1(g), explicitly per-
mitting courts to consider post-offense rehabilitative efforts.  See SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL, supra note 108, app. C, amend. 459.
135. United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir. 1991) (upholding denial of adjust-
ment to defendant who raised an entrapment defense); see also, e.g., United States v. Newson,
46 F.3d 730, 734 (8th Cir. 1995) (upholding denial of adjustment where defendant sought to
withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that counsel had misevaluated an entrapment defense);
United States v. Emenogha, 1 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that entrapment defense
precludes adjustment for acceptance of responsibility); United States v. Villarreal, 920 F.2d
1218, 1224 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding denial of adjustment to defendant who told probation
officer that he had been entrapped); United States v. Cianscewski, 894 F.2d 74, 83 (3d Cir.
1990) (upholding district court’s finding that entrapment defense precludes adjustment). But
see United States v. Fleener, 900 F.2d 914, 917-18 (6th Cir. 1990) (upholding grant of adjust-
ment to defendant who raised entrapment defense to three of five counts in indictment where
the defendant had been very cooperative with law enforcement officials).
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insanity defense was held not to have accepted responsibility.136  An-
other defendant who claimed that he lacked the necessary criminal
intent for embezzlement due to his problems with drugs and alcohol
was denied an adjustment by the sentencing judge.137
Two Seventh Circuit decisions, United States v. Beserra138 and
United States v. Reno,139 best illustrate the difficulty that defendants
face in obtaining an acceptance of responsibility adjustment when
they suggest deterministic explanations (or offer deterministic de-
fenses such as the insanity defense) for their crimes.  Jesus Beserra
pled guilty to one count of conspiring to possess cocaine with the in-
tent to distribute.140  Addressing the court, Beserra said:
I made a terrible thing and involved myself and paid attention to the
person that was the informant, and in those days I was drinking a lot
and that is what drove me to do this, to pay attention to this person.
And because of that I feel that I really beg your forgiveness.141
The district court judge denied Beserra’s request for an acceptance of
responsibility adjustment because he concluded that Beserra sought
to shift the blame onto alcohol and bad companions.142  On appeal,
the Seventh Circuit affirmed.143
Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Richard Posner acknowl-
edged the dilemma faced by defendants and courts, exemplified by
Beserra.144  A statement like Beserra’s might be a self-aware acknowl-
edgment that capitulating to temptations such as alcohol can lead to
trouble.  As such, Beserra could be viewed as having accepted re-
sponsibility not merely by inartfully apologizing, but also by taking
the necessary step toward “self-reform” of repudiating bad and de-
136. See Reno, 992 F.2d at 744-45.
137. See Curran, 967 F.2d at 6-7.  On appeal the circuit court ruled that the court could
withhold the adjustment if it determined on the basis of Curran’s defense and the other evi-
dence before it that he had not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct.  It also ruled,
however, that the defense did not necessarily preclude a finding of acceptance of responsibility.
Because the basis for the district court’s decision was unclear, the circuit court vacated the sen-
tence and remanded the case to the district court for clarification or further consideration.  See
id.
138. 967 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1992).
139. 992 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1993).
140. See Beserra, 967 F.2d at 255.
141. Id.  Beserra made a similar statement to the probation officer who conducted his pre-
sentence investigation.  See id.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 256.
144. See id. at 255-56.
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structive habits.  On the other hand, his statement might be regarded
as an attempt to deny responsibility by blaming “demon alcohol and
evil companions,” instead of himself.145  In this vein, Judge Posner
likened Beserra to Hamlet, who “apologized to Laertes by saying
that it was not Hamlet who had wronged him but Hamlet’s mad-
ness.”146
The paradox of Beserra is that the defendant who has nothing
more to say about his crime than: “I did it. I’m sorry,” thereby ac-
knowledging that he freely chose to do wrong, may fare better than
the defendant who recognizes that he succumbed to particular temp-
tations or extrinsic circumstances, even though “the defendant who
has and makes no excuses—who takes full responsibility for his
crime—confesses to being unable to point to anything that might
mitigate his criminality.”147  Because the trial judge’s factual finding
that Beserra had not accepted responsibility was reversible only on a
finding of clear error, the Seventh Circuit could decide the case with-
out resolving the paradox, and concluded that the district court had
not clearly erred in finding insufficient evidence of true remorse and
acceptance of personal responsibility.148
The second Seventh Circuit decision, Reno, stands in striking
contrast to Commonwealth v. Battis, the early nineteenth century de-
cision discussed above.149 In Battis, the Massachusetts court had
strenuously attempted to discourage a guilty plea, questioning
whether a sane person would ever plead guilty to a capital offense.150
Reno, by contrast, asked whether someone who is mentally ill and as-
serts an insanity defense could accept responsibility.  Reno was con-
victed of bank robbery after a trial in which he had relied on an in-
sanity defense.151  There was no question that Reno suffered from
chronic paranoid schizophrenia.152  Nonetheless, the jury credited the
government’s psychiatric expert’s testimony that Reno understood
the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the robbery and there-
fore concluded that he was not legally insane.153  As part of the pre-
145. Id. at 255.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 255-56.
148. See id. at 256.
149. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
150. See id.
151. See United States v. Reno, 992 F.2d 739, 741 (7th Cir. 1993).
152. See id.
153. See id.
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sentence investigation Reno submitted a defendant’s version of the
offense, in which he apologized to the teller and to everyone involved
in the case.  He also wrote:
Now that I look back I know I was wrong and I am very ashamed
because I could not control my illness and I am sorry I did not con-
tinue the treatment that was necessary to bring me back to reality.  I
understand now that the refusal to continue the treatment was part
of my illness . . . . I was found guilty by a jury, and now an [sic] pre-
pared to face the consequences for my actions.154
The district court held that Reno had not accepted responsibility
and was therefore not entitled to an adjustment.155  In a thoughtful
decision, Judge Zagel stated that a denial of responsibility in a legal
sense, by an assertion of the insanity defense, was theoretically com-
patible with acceptance of responsibility in a moral sense.156  The lat-
ter is all that Guidelines Section 3E1.1 requires.157  Nevertheless, he
interpreted Reno’s statement as a denial of moral responsibility.158
Judge Zagel stated that Reno “essentially blames what occurred on
his illness, and I don’t think that’s acceptance of responsibility.”159
The decision failed to specify what a defendant like Reno would have
to do to evince satisfactory acceptance of responsibility, and it sug-
gests that, perhaps, the compatibility of an insanity defense and ac-
ceptance of responsibility under the Sentencing Guidelines is more
theoretical than real.  After Bessera, the Seventh Circuit held that the
district court’s factual determination that Reno had not accepted re-
sponsibility was not clearly erroneous.160
What are the meanings and effects of today’s enthusiasm for
confession and the rituals and rules of adequate acceptance of re-
sponsibility?  How have these meanings and effects changed from
those of colonial New England?
For the defendant, acceptance of responsibility is one of the few
available means to a shorter sentence.  Typically, it is the mechanism
through which a defendant receives the benefits of his plea bargain.
Further, while the goals of deterrence, retribution, and incapacitation






160. See id. at 744-45.
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seem to have supplanted rehabilitation as the primary purpose of
punishment, the acceptance of responsibility provision reflects a re-
sidual belief that confession can help transform an individual benefi-
cially, and indeed may be a necessary precondition for rehabilita-
tion.161  Thus, for some defendants acceptance of responsibility may
be “therapeutic confession.”162  Yet for others it may be coerced self-
denunciation, the lesser of two evils offered by the state.  For others
still, it is a cynical ritual, a series of empty words that must be recited
as part of the criminal justice game.
Like the gallows speeches and conversion narratives of early
New England, a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility is produced
within a social context and has social, as well as individual conse-
quences.  As shown above, a defendant must conform to rules and
conventions of proper acceptance of responsibility to receive the ad-
justment.163  Further, as an inducement to guilty pleas, the adjustment
serves as a lubricant for the federal criminal justice system, allowing
most cases to be resolved without trial.164  But the differences be-
tween the two types of confessions are also striking.  Given the secu-
larization of our notions of crime, and the more limited application of
the death penalty, the high drama of salvation or damnation is no
longer center stage; it might not even be in the theater.  Gone also is
the broad communal participation in the drama of crime, repentance,
and punishment.  Reflecting both the movement away from criminal
punishment as public spectacle and the professionalization of the
criminal justice system, the broad public neither helps the defendant
161. Admittedly, one can reconcile the acceptance of responsibility provision with these
other purposes of punishment, as well.  The criminal defendant who has expressed genuine re-
morse appears to be a good candidate for a sentence reduction whether on a theory that the
remorseful criminal deserves less severe punishment, or that having renounced his criminal
ways he is less of a threat to society and therefore society can gamble on an earlier release, or
because the practice of offering an acceptance of responsibility adjustment will encourage
guilty pleas and cooperation with authorities.
162. The phrase is William Nelson’s.  Nelson applies the phrase to the different, but not
unrelated practice of court-mandated participation in a group therapy or other counseling pro-
gram as a condition of parole.  See William A. Nelson, The New Inquisition: State Compulsion
of Therapeutic Confessions, 20 VT. L. REV. 951, 952 (1996).  Nelson defines therapeutic confes-
sion as “confession not to show evidence of guilt, but rather evidence of repentance or, in the
modern phrase, amenability to treatment.”  Id. at 980.
163. See supra notes 101-62 and accompanying text.
164. This was also true of the practice of plea bargaining prior to the adoption of the
Guidelines.  The Sentencing Commission noted that approximately 85% of the pre-Guidelines
federal convictions that it studied were the product of guilty pleas.  See U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 101, at 159.
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along the path of repentance, nor comprises the audience for his pro-
fession of remorse.  The adequacy of a criminal’s acceptance of re-
sponsibility is no longer a question for the crowd on execution day.
Instead, it is a matter for the probation officer who prepares the pre-
sentence report and the judge, or judges, with whom the ultimate de-
cision resides.  Indeed, the Guidelines as a whole seem to conceal
questions of reform and desert from the public eye.  My colleague
Kevin McMunigal has observed that the Guidelines have reshaped
the way that lawyers and judges talk about, and, consequently, per-
haps the way they think about, sentencing.  While the discourse of
sentencing revolved in the past around such questions as the defen-
dant’s future dangerousness or capacity for rehabilitation, questions
reflecting the competing purposes of punishment, it now focuses on
the appropriate point on the grid on which to plot the defendant.
The judge is likely simply to announce that having considered the
presentence report and having taken into consideration the appropri-
ate adjustments, including the Section 3E1.1 adjustment, the appro-
priate place on the grid is “x.”  The resulting discussion is similarly
likely to be coded in the language of the grid.  While traditional sen-
tencing concerns are built into the Guidelines, through the use of
such factors as the defendant’s criminal history, the relationship be-
tween a debate over whether the defendant belongs in square 32 or
31 and historical notions of the purpose of punishment is likely to be
lost on nearly everyone but the cognoscenti of the criminal bar.165
In addition to the relatively hidden character of the modern
criminal’s acceptance of responsibility,166 a different understanding of
crime than that of colonial New Englanders contributes to an altered
social meaning of acceptance of responsibility.  Lacking the Puritans’
theological understanding of our own capacity to act criminally, and
possessing a far stronger fear of being the victim of crime than did
the Puritans, we no longer identify with the criminal, either individu-
ally, or as a community.  The defendant is perceived as a dangerous,
165. These comments are based upon conversations I had with my colleague Kevin McMu-
nigal.  I hasten to add that McMunigal’s comments are based on his casual observations and not
on a more systematic study. While I think my extrapolations are sound, any faulty generaliza-
tion from those observations are the product of my lack of caution, not his.
166. This is broken occasionally by media accounts of particular trials, or by the selective
revelations of Court TV.  As a viewer of the nightly local news, I have the nonempirical, but
strong, impression that two favorite tableaus of local broadcasters are the repentant convicted
criminal’s statement prior to sentencing, or the angry judge’s denunciation of the unrepentant
convicted criminal.
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often racialized, Other.167  Consequently, acceptance of responsibility
has little to do with inclusion and reintegration into either a secular
community or a community of saints, although some residue of this
idea can be found in the sentence adjustment and its prerequisites of
genuine remorse.
At their most removed from Puritan confessions, criminal state-
ments of responsibility are empty incantations that must be recited
before a federal criminal defendant can receive the reward for her
guilty plea.168  Under this view the Guidelines’ acceptance of respon-
sibility provision essentially regularizes and contains the pre-
Guidelines’ practice of rewarding guilty pleas.  Its purpose is to foster
prosecutorial and judicial economy.  It also encourages defendants to
assist police and prosecutors and efforts to make the victims of crime
whole.  The Beserra court captures this utilitarian understanding of
the Guidelines’ provision in stating:
The framers of the sentencing guidelines were not, we take it, ad-
dressing the metaphysics of human responsibility.  No doubt they
wanted to encourage the guilty to plead guilty in order to save the
government and the judiciary the costs of trial, as well as to reward
defendants for concrete acts of assistance or restitution.169
Only secondarily does Beserra echo older themes of reform, although
it recasts these in contemporary utilitarian terms.170
One cannot deny the importance of these practical ends in the
Guidelines’ acceptance of responsibility scheme.  Certainly, one of
the Sentencing Commission’s primary purposes in framing the accep-
tance of responsibility provision was to create an incentive for so-
cially desired behavior.  That a struggle over the soul of the accused
is not in issue can be seen in the mechanical regularity with which the
adjustment is granted.171  Yet, the Sentencing Commission clearly had
more in mind than simply setting a standardized price for guilty pleas.
167. A notorious example is the Willie Horton ad in the 1988 presidential election.
168. Judge Alex Kozinski refers to this performance as a “mini-morality play” and a “self-
flagellatory ritual.”  United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 768, 770 (9th Cir. 1991) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting).
169. United States v. Beserra, 967 F.2d 254, 256 (7th Cir. 1992).
170. The court states that the framers of the Guidelines may have also wanted “to lighten
the sentence of criminals in whom glimmerings of conscience could be discerned,” because
such criminals are “on the way to developing those internal checks that would keep many peo-
ple from committing crimes even if the expected costs of criminal punishment were lower than
they are.” Id.
171. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, the Commission rejected a proposal to apply an automatic
fixed sentence adjustment in every instance of a guilty plea partly, as
its chairman has noted, because such an automatic discount without
regard for the “circumstances of the offense or the defendant’s post-
offense conduct . . . would result in unjustified windfalls in many
cases,” and would be contrary to “the public’s perception of jus-
tice.”172  Moreover, even if the overwhelming majority of defendants
receive the adjustment fairly automatically after making the appro-
priately penitent gestures, those cases that do find their way into the
reporters tend to involve questions of the credibility and adequacy of
the defendant’s penitence.  At least in those cases that for one reason
or another deviate from the routine, defendants, like colonial New
England miscreants before them, are examined for “visible signs”
that their “conversions” are authentic and complete.173  An element
of soul saving, or at least rehabilitation, still inheres in modern no-
tions of criminal confession.
The unregenerate utilitarian might argue that I have read too
much into the acceptance of responsibility provision.  Acceptance of
responsibility remains one of the last reserves of judicial discretion
under the federal sentencing scheme.  Perhaps, she would say, the
Sentencing Commission rejected an automatic discount as a sop to
district court judges.  But it is hard to agree with the idea that the ac-
ceptance of responsibility provision is a sort of judicial rent extracted
from the Sentencing Commission, and I have not encountered a flesh
and blood unregenerate utilitarian, as opposed to an ideal-type one,
who makes this argument.  Moreover, to explain the provision this
way begs the question.  It does not explain why the Guidelines con-
tain this particular holdout of judicial discretion.  Nor does it explain
why judges would make this area one of particular concern.
I have suggested above that confessions such as Esther Rodg-
ers’s may have eased the consciences of everyone implicated in her
punishment.174  Sometimes, modern confession may have the same ef-
172. William W. Wilkins, Jr., Plea Negotiations, Acceptance of Responsibility, Role of the
Offender, and Departures: Policy Decisions in the Promulgation of Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 181, 191 (1988).
173. In Bessera, Judge Posner writes that judges should look first for “expiatory deeds” and
only failing these, for evidence of conscience in a defendant’s professions. 967 F.2d at 256.
“[W]e think,” he writes, “the [Guidelines’] Application Note is on the right track in emphasiz-
ing deeds over words—external, verifiable, expiatory acts over self-serving, unverifiable reports
of interior mental states.”  Id.
174. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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fect.  Certainly, in some cases prosecutors and judges must have
mixed emotions about the fate of a criminal defendant.  More impor-
tant, I believe, is the role of acceptance of criminal responsibility in
helping to provide a sense of order and purpose to the criminal jus-
tice system.  While the ritual of confession no longer serves to legiti-
mize civil authority and the criminal justice system for the public,
perhaps it serves that role for many judges.  Section 3E1.1 does more
than restore to judges a measure of sentencing discretion.  It also
satisfies an intuitive sense of desert by enabling judges to differenti-
ate between the redeemable and the unredeemable criminal.  As dis-
cussed above, judges have long exercised the power to distinguish
criminals in this way.175  At least one survey of judges revealed that
many believe that criminals who accept responsibility for their crimes
are less likely to be repeat offenders than are those who do not ac-
cept responsibility,176 and the Commission recognized this belief in
framing the Guidelines.177  Armed with this belief, judges may be in-
clined to regard defendants who accept responsibility as less of a
threat to society, thus reducing the need for incarceration.
The notion that criminals who accept responsibility for their acts
pose a lesser threat of recidivism reflects either a belief that the deci-
sion to confess is a marker of better people with stronger character,
or that the act of confession, itself, is transformative (or both).  In ei-
ther case, the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility follows.
Notwithstanding its birth in a statute that renounced rehabilitation as
an appropriate purpose of imprisonment, the acceptance of responsi-
bility provision reflects a belief that confession is good for the soul,
even if that confession is coerced by the sentencing rules.178  It also re-
flects a belief that criminals who accept responsibility deserve lesser
punishment than those who do not.  Perhaps this belief stems from
175. See supra Part I.B.
176. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
177. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 101, at 50; El-
len M. Bryant, Section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Bargaining with the Guilty,
44 CATH. U. L. REV. 1269, 1274 (1995).
178. Congress, in creating the Sentencing Commission, also stated that: “The Commission
shall insure that the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of
imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant.”  28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (1994); see
also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989) (stating that the Sentencing Reform
Act “rejects imprisonment as a means of promoting rehabilitation”); United States v. Braxton,
903 F.2d 292, 296 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that “rehabilitation is not a factor in the considera-
tion of acceptance of responsibility” where the district court had denied an adjustment to a de-
fendant who because of his emotional and mental limitations was unable to accept responsibil-
ity to the point of beginning the process of rehabilitation).
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the assumption that someone who confronts honestly her wrongful
behavior, rather than looking for excuses, has taken upon herself part
of the task of punishment.  Or, perhaps it stems from a sense that ac-
ceptance of responsibility, whether or not accompanied by coopera-
tion with authorities or restitution, is an act of reparation.
The acceptance of responsibility adjustment engenders a final
social consequence: it reinforces an ideology of desocialized individ-
ual choice and responsibility because it insists that crime is a product
of individual character failure, and is wholly unrelated to social or
other extrinsic circumstances.179  Defendants who blame companions
for leading them astray, who attribute their crimes to the effects of
drug or alcohol addiction, or who explain their crimes as a result of
desperate poverty, may have gained important insight into the causes
of their behavior.  Armed with this insight, a defendant may have be-
gun the process of return to communal norms when she expresses
remorse.  Yet the defendant who dares to set her crimes in a social
context of family, companions, neighborhood, or, heaven forbid,
race, gender, or class, is likely to provoke the judge’s ire and squan-
der her chance at an acceptance of responsibility adjustment.  The
Beserra court, for example, characterizes such statements as self-
pitying, and it contrasts “genuine remorse” with “indignation at being
a victim of circumstances—of poverty or drink or a brutal upbringing
or whatever else may have predisposed him to criminal activity.”180
Indeed, as the Seventh Circuit’s Reno decision shows, statements that
invoke a social context are not the only ones that will render the de-
fendant ineligible for the adjustment.181  Otherwise genuine remorse
accompanied by reference to an internal imperative that contributed
179. I am neither arguing that character will play no role in a person’s crimes, nor that so-
cial circumstances excuse criminal acts.  But granting both, I am arguing that by silencing ex-
planations that go beyond a monocausal confession of defective character, the acceptance of
responsibility law distorts our understanding of crime and contributes to a distorted ideology of
atomistic human agency with overtones of Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner.
180. United States v. Beserra, 967 F.2d 254, 256 (7th Cir. 1992).  The court did, however,
acknowledge the paradox that “the defendant who has and makes no excuses—who takes full
responsibility for his crime—confesses to being unable to point to anything that might mitigate
his criminality,” and nevertheless that defendant, “who acknowledges having committed a
crime because he chose freely to do so—being, at the time anyway, an evil person—[will] get a
shorter sentence than a weak person who acknowledges having committed his crime out of
weakness.”  Id. at 255-56.  The court is clearly not fully at ease with its decision.
181. See United States v. Reno, 992 F.2d 739, 744-45 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming the district
court’s decision not to adjust the defendant’s sentence because, in the words of the district
court, the defendant “did not and perhaps not even now accepts responsibility in the moral
sense”).
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to the crime, here Reno’s comment that his resistance to treatment
(for which he apologized and felt shame) was part of the disease, can
also be disqualifying.
The social consequence of acceptance of responsibility law ex-
tends beyond the outcomes in individual cases.  It reinforces a world-
view that suppresses social inquiry into the causes and meanings of
crime, just as it tends to suppress part of the story that future Beser-
ras and Renos have to tell, at least well-counseled ones.  It distorts
our understanding of our world, and undermines our will and our
confidence to change it.
II. MCNAMARA’S CONFESSION
A. The Confessors’ Responses
You fasten the triggers
For the others to fire
Then you set back and watch
When the death count gets higher
You hide in your mansion
As young people’s blood
Flows out of their bodies
And is buried in the mud
. . .
How much do I know
To talk out of turn
You might say that I’m young
You might say I’m unlearned
But there’s one thing I know
Though I’m younger than you
Even Jesus would never
Forgive what you do182
The brothel echoes with the chime of bells—
you twist and turn in bed; then you wake up.
Your boat of love will cross the sea of lust;
your beauty’s waves must reach the Dhyana grove.
Grab Wisdom’s sword and cleanse your filthy heart;
tell Bodhi beads and weave your karmic fate.
182. BOB DYLAN, Masters of War, reprinted in LYRICS, 1968-1985 (1985).
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Your temple’s nice and cool, with moon and wind: no
Buddha yet, you live a god’s good life!183
To understand the critical reaction to In Retrospect, it is useful to
get a sense of how often and in what terms McNamara acknowledges
his mistakes.  Acknowledgments of mistakes and expressions of re-
morse dot the landscape of Robert McNamara’s memoirs; the most
notable among these is McNamara’s overall assessment of America’s
venture in Vietnam: “we were wrong, terribly wrong.”184  This is the
statement most frequently found in the press reports and commen-
taries discussing In Retrospect.  Yet this statement hardly stands
alone.  Repeatedly, McNamara identifies instances of the flawed as-
sumptions and analyses that he and others within the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations made, their continued failure to confront
the contradictions in those assumptions and to look beyond a narrow
range of responses to events, and the lost opportunities that resulted.
On a single page McNamara writes that “the foundations of our deci-
sion making were gravely flawed,” as he and his associates “badly
misread China’s objectives;” “totally underestimated the nationalist
aspect of Ho Chi Minh’s movement;” “fail[ed] to consider China and
Vietnam . . . as [they] did Yugoslavia—a Communist nation inde-
pendent of Moscow;” accepted “ill-founded judgments . . . without
debate;” and “failed to analyze [their] assumptions critically.”185
Throughout the book McNamara continues this tone of self-
reproach and this catalogue of errors, a long list of “we misjudgeds”
and “I should haves.”  It “shocks and saddens” McNamara that the
U.S. became involved in the events that led to the overthrow and as-
sassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem, without undertaking an
analysis of whether we could win with Diem, without evaluating the
alternatives to Diem, and without first taking appropriate measures
183. Huynh Man Dat, The Old Whore Becomes a Nun, in AN ANTHOLOGY OF VIET-
NAMESE POEMS FROM THE ELEVENTH THROUGH THE TWENTIETH CENTURIES  90-91 (Huynh
Sanh Thong ed. & trans., 1996).  Huynh Sanh Thong notes that Ton Tho Tuong (1825-1877)
profited handsomely as a French collaborator.  “In his old age, he wished to express repentance
with a poem entitled ‘The old whore becomes a nun’.” Id. at 91.  Huynh Man Dat offered a
biting reply in a poem of the same title.  “Dhyana grove” refers to contemplation or medita-
tion, and “Bodhi” to Buddhist enlightenment.  The phrase “‘moon and wind’ . . . suggests illicit
love.”  Id.  Thong’s translation and interpretation of Dat’s poem is not beyond dispute.  For an
alternative view on the relationship between Dat’s and Tuong’s poems, see Electronic Mail
message from Ming Quang, Dec. 14, 1997, on file with author.
184. MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at xvi.
185. Id. at 33.
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to attempt to make Diem “mend his ways.”186  A memo McNamara
prepared early in President Johnson’s administration, which
McNamara believes reinforced Johnson’s inclinations regarding
Vietnam, was “limited and shallow” and left “basic questions . . . un-
examined.”187  Repeatedly, he writes, he failed to press the military
planners to examine their assumptions and to answer the hard ques-
tions regarding the costs and likelihood of success of U.S. efforts.  Of
a July 1965 meeting with General William Westmoreland, then com-
mander of U.S. troops in Vietnam and a prime advocate for escala-
tion of the war, McNamara writes:
I clearly erred by not forcing—a knock-down, drag-out debate over
the loose assumptions, unasked questions, and thin analyses under-
lying our military strategy in Vietnam.  I had spent twenty years as a
manager identifying problems and forcing organizations—often
against their will—to think deeply and realistically about alternative
courses of action and their consequences.  I doubt I will ever fully
understand why I did not do so here.188
When, in Senate hearings in February 1966, George Kennan re-
alistically downplayed the China threat and noted that because of
China’s turn inward the American stake in Vietnam was greatly di-
minished, “Kennan’s point failed to catch our attention.”189  Instead,
“blinded by our assumptions,” McNamara and the warmakers held to
a “totally incorrect appraisal of the ‘Chinese Threat’.”190
The litany continues.  The failure to seek unambiguous Congres-
sional authorization through a declaration of war “was certainly
wrong.”191  McNamara notes several lost opportunities to pursue a
political solution.  Diplomatic initiatives for peace were stillborn be-
cause McNamara and his colleagues found the necessary compro-
mises unacceptable, or distrusted the messenger, or because the dip-
186. Id. at 55; see also id. at 70.
187. Id. at 107 (discussing Jan. 7, 1964, memorandum).
188. Id. at 203; see also id. at 108 (“It was our job to demand the answers.  We did not press
hard enough for them.  And the chiefs did not volunteer them.”); id. at 182 (“[W]e—and espe-
cially I, as secretary—should have been far more forceful in developing a military strategy and
a long-term plan for the force structure required to carry it out.”); id. at 243 (discussing his fail-
ure to force debate between Westmoreland and Marines on appropriate strategic approach in
the field.).
189. Id. at 215.
190. Id. at 215, 219.
191. Id. at 128; see also id. at 191-92 (“[W]e chose to sweep the debate under the Oval Of-
fice carpet.”).
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lomatic moves coincided with undiplomatic stepped-up American
military initiatives.192  After describing how the heaviest bombing of
the war to date had derailed one diplomatic initiative, McNamara
writes: “We failed miserably to integrate and coordinate our diplo-
matic and military actions.”193  McNamara also repeatedly decries
their failure to consider withdrawal as a serious option.194
Despite the many admissions of error contained in the book,
most commentators and reviewers have deemed the book a failure,
and found McNamara’s confession to be inadequate at best.195 To
critics, McNamara’s acceptance of responsibility and conversion have
been no more complete than the “conversion” of Huynh Man Dat’s
old whore; McNamara is no worthier of forgiveness than Dylan’s
masters of war.196
One can explain some of the reaction as merely a matter of re-
newing old battles and settling old scores.  Yet there seems to be
more at work here.  An examination of the reaction can illuminate
much not only about Robert McNamara and our unresolved relation-
ship with the Vietnam War, but also about the role of public confes-
sion in modern life.
For some critics no confession could be adequate or appropriate.
To them, McNamara is not entitled to a sense of resolution and inner
peace, and he does not deserve the chance to rehabilitate his image
or to try to influence future generations’ opinions about him.  Many
of his critics believe that the harm McNamara wrought is simply too
great to be excused by any confession.  The New York Times scath-
ingly editorialized that McNamara’s “regret cannot be huge enough
to balance the books for our dead soldiers . . . . What he took from
192. See, e.g., id. at 55, 62, 113-14 (discussing that although de Gaulle’s stated objective in
1964 was neutralization, the absence of a substantive proposal led the U.S. to abandon the ob-
jective); id. at 247-52 (illustrating how the Ronning missions of spring 1966, the Marigold mis-
sion of fall/winter 1966, and the Sunflower mission of early 1967 were derailed because the U.S.
continued to bomb Vietnam); id. at 295-302 (describing the thwarting of the Aubrac and Mar-
covich missions by continued U.S. bombing).
193. Id. at 299.
194. See id. at 63, 164, 320-21.
195. There have been some exceptions to the generally negative reaction.  See, e.g., Edito-
rial, McNamara’s Book, COMMONWEAL, May 5, 1995, at 3, 3; Larry Maddry, Don’t Let Ire Ob-
scure Message of McNamara, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk), July 8, 1995, at E1; Regretting Viet-
nam, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 12, 1995, at 20.
196. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
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them cannot be repaid by prime-time apology and stale tears, three
decades late.”197
As the New York Times editorial suggests, for some critics
McNamara’s failure to voice his doubts about the war sooner com-
pounds the enormity of his offense.  Indeed, a common theme among
many of the critics and commentators has been to condemn
McNamara for failing to speak out on the war at a time when his
voice might have made a difference.198  “Now he tells us,” writes both
columnist Mary McGrory and Norfolk’s Virginian-Pilot.199  These
critics invoke a laches-like bar.  The time for your confession, they
tell McNamara, has long past, and your self-recriminations will not
now be entertained.  The problem with McNamara’s late confession
is not so much that “late repentance is seldom true,” although some
critics do question his motive and sincerity.200  Rather, echoing both
the Puritan tradition of criminal conversion201 and the modern law of
acceptance of responsibility,202 the criticism reflects a belief that
words alone are often insufficient markers of full repentance and ac-
ceptance of responsibility.  One is obligated, instead, to act to undo as
much of the harm as one can and to avert further harm.  The empha-
sis here is on the healing and mitigating effects of confession, primar-
ily for the community and for those especially injured.  Having borne
his doubts silently while the war still raged and his confession might
have done some good, McNamara has forfeited his right to be heard.
197. Mr. McNamara’s War, supra note 13.  For similar expressions from across the political
spectrum, see Richard Benedetto, McNamara Doesn’t Want Healing; He’s Looking for For-
giveness, GANNETT NEWS SERV., Apr. 21, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File;
Bill Kaplan, McNamara’s ‘Purgation’ Isn’t Enough, WIS. STATE J., June 19, 1995, at 7A; Rich-
ard Reeves, Confessions No Reason to Forgive, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN SENTINEL, Apr. 18,
1995, at 9A; Zuzel, supra note 11, at A13.
198. For a representative sampling in addition to the New York Times editorial, see Drinan,
supra note 8, at 24; James Fallows, Morning Edition: Too Late to Say He’s Sorry (National
Public Radio broadcast, Apr. 11, 1995), available at Atlantic Unbound (visited Jan. 27, 1998)
<http://www.agtnet.com/atlantic/atlweb/jf-npr/jf504-11.htm>; Halberstam, supra note 5; Edito-
rial, ‘In Retrospect’ Vietnam Confession, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 18, 1995, at B4; Kaus, supra
note 12, at 6; Lucas, supra note 11; Mary McGrory, McNamara’s Book: Too Little, Too Late,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 17, 1995, at 7B; Editorial, McNamara’s Mea Culpa Is Too
Late, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Apr. 16, 1995, at A14; McNamara’s Repentance, TIKKUN,
May 1995, at 6; Editorial, Silence Is Sometimes a Lie, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 17, 1995, at
8A; Editorial, The Vietnam War; A Truth Too Late, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk), Apr. 13,
1995, at A14; Zuzel, supra note 11.
199. McGrory, supra note 198; The Vietnam War; A Truth Too Late, supra note 198.
200. See, e.g., Benedetto, supra note 197; Kaus, supra note 12, at 6; West, supra note 7.
201. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
202. See United States v. Beserra, 967 F.2d 254, 255 (7th Cir. 1992).
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Indeed, for some, his confession is not only doomed to ineffi-
cacy, but causes injury anew. A Time reader wrote: “Shame on
McNamara for trying to assuage his guilty conscience by making us
share his pain.  He should have been man enough to carry his guilt in
silence.”203  These critics fear that McNamara’s admission that he sent
American soldiers into battle despite his growing belief that the ef-
fort was a futile waste of lives will resurrect the grief of the families
of those who died in Vietnam and will renew the pain of those who
served and returned wounded in body or spirit.204  To even talk about
the war is to reopen old wounds.  But to suggest that it was anything
other than a noble, though tragic undertaking, and certainly to sug-
gest that at least one of the principal warmakers recognized that it
was a senseless waste, would disturb the peace that those soldiers and
their families had been able to make with their past.  A major theme
framing the press coverage of the book and McNamara’s book tour
was its impact on Vietnam veterans.  Stories reported confrontations
between veterans and McNamara, or veteran demonstrations at his
speaking engagements and their calls for him to donate the proceeds
of the book to veteran organizations.205  Newspapers reported an in-
crease in the number of calls to veteran counseling centers in the
wake of the book’s release.206  Four brothers, all Vietnam veterans,
filed suit against McNamara, alleging dereliction of his duty as Secre-
203. PAUL HENDRICKSON, THE LIVING AND THE DEAD: ROBERT MCNAMARA AND FIVE
LIVES OF A LOST WAR 378 (1996) (quoting letter from Steve Altig to Time magazine, reprinted
in TIME, May 15, 1995, at 6).
204. See, e.g., Benedetto, supra note 197; Fertel, supra note 6; Tim Gallagher, McNamara’s
Unintended Message, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), Apr. 27, 1995, at 49A; Ellen Good-
man, McNamara Exudes Sadness; Still Doesn’t Get It, IDAHO STATESMAN (Boise), May 7, 1995,
at 19A; Lucas, supra note 11.
205. See, e.g., Mark Lasswell & Sarah Skolnik, Aftershocks; A Mea Culpa from Robert
McNamara, an Architect of the Vietnam War, Sets off an Angry, Anguished Debate, PEOPLE,
May 8, 1995, at 233; Catherine Walsh, Robert McNamara Discusses His Book, ‘In Retrospect:
The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam,’ at Harvard University, AMERICA, May 20, 1995, at 9;
Richard Benedetto, McNamara Plans to Donate Book Profits, USA TODAY, Apr. 20, 1995, at
9A; Jeffry A. Berger, In Retrospect: The Tragedies and Lessons of McNamara’s Trip to Brown,
COLLEGE  HILL  INDEP. (visited  Dec. 6, 1997)  <http://www.netspace.org/indy/issues/02-29-96/
opinions3.html>; Marc Fisher, The No-Win Vietnam Memoir, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1995, at
D1 [hereinafter Fisher, Memoir]; Michael Hurd & Mike Kelley, Still Split over Vietnam; Pro-
testers Seek Apology; McNamara Reveals Little, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May 2, 1995, at A1.
206. See Book Angers Veterans; Counseling Calls Up over McNamara, DAYTON DAILY
NEWS, Apr. 18, 1995, at 3A.
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tary of Defense and intentional infliction of emotional distress on all
who served in Vietnam.207
For these sundry critics, McNamara’s confession is untimely, ei-
ther because he waived his right to be heard by failing to speak when
it mattered, or because the hurt is still too strong for the Vietnam
generation and their families to endure a dispassionate lecture on the
“lessons of Vietnam.”  These critics ask him to “go away and shut
up.”208
Much of the criticism of In Retrospect echoes standards for con-
fessions that should sound familiar by now.  In exposing the book’s
flaws, the critics identify several earmarks of a good confession.  An
adequate public confession is offered in the spirit of humility and
self-denunciation.  It does not hold back self-scrutiny and self-
revelation, but rather confronts and reveals all, including the most
uncomfortable truths.  And it accepts responsibility unhesitatingly
and fully, without attempting to excuse, or justify, or to shift blame
onto others.  Applying these standards to McNamara, many critics
find his confession wanting.
An adequate confession is complete and unqualified.  In Puritan
New England it flowed only after the sinner had reached a point of
spiritual agony when she recognized the full horror of her sins.  By
contrast, many have viewed McNamara’s confession as neither com-
plete nor unqualified.  He understates his responsibility for some de-
cisions and events, they charge, and, at times, he is defensive when
discussing his role in the war.  While any memoirist is necessarily se-
lective in his retelling of the past, McNamara sometimes appears bent
on minimizing his fault by his choices of what to tell and what to
omit.  Moreover, he ignores or remains blind to much that he ought
to address in a mea culpa.  Writes Mickey Kaus, “it appears closer to
207. See Eduardo Montes, Texas Brothers Sue McNamara for $100 Million over Vietnam,
AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May 16, 1995, at B2; see also Eduardo Montes, Brothers in Arms;
Despite Lawsuit, Siblings Say They’d Go to Vietnam Again, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, June 15,
1995, at B3.  The brothers’ suit was dismissed for failure of service of process.  See HEN-
DRICKSON, supra note 203, at 408.
208. John T. Correll, The Confessions of Robert S. McNamara, A.F. MAG., June 1995, at 2.
In his commentary on National Public Radio, James Fallows said, “In the cycles of life, a desire
to square accounts is natural, but Robert McNamara has forfeited his right to do so in public.
You missed your chance, Mr. Secretary.  It would have been better to go out silently[.]”  Fal-
lows, supra note 198, reprinted in Atlantic Unbound, supra note 198.  For similar sentiments see
Lucas, supra note 11; West, supra note 7; Zuzel, supra note 11.
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a modified limited hangout than a mea culpa.”209  A few examples
should suffice.
Though McNamara makes no claims of having been “out of the
loop” as the decisions to escalate the war were made, his recitation of
these events tends to underplay his role and to shift the onus onto the
generals and the politicians threatening Lyndon Johnson and his
Great Society from the right flank.  The decisions to bomb North
Vietnam, to send combat troops to Vietnam, to then alter their mis-
sion from a defensive to an offensive one, and to commit increasing
numbers of men, were, according to McNamara, responses to this
pressure by men whose greatest fault was their lack of  imagination to
question America’s containment policy or to find better solutions to
the challenge of Vietnam.210  In response to this effort to minimize re-
sponsibility, David Halberstam writes: “McNamara . . . wasn’t merely
the loyal domestic policy servant he portrays himself to be in these
pages.  Publicly and privately, he was a fierce advocate of escalation,
and for a time he became the driving force of the Vietnam
War . . . .”211  John Correll, the editor-in-chief of Air Force Magazine,
adds, “[McNamara] was not some star-crossed functionary who went
passively along with a policy he opposed.  He was so fiery an advo-
cate that Vietnam became known as ‘McNamara’s War.’”212
McNamara’s treatment of the question of his and the Johnson
administration’s honesty with Congress and the American people
about the war provoked considerable negative comment.  He does
recount a number of specific instances where the Johnson administra-
tion misled Congress or the press, and admits that at times he was
“less than candid,” yet the overall impression that he gives is that
with few exceptions his and the administration’s misstatements were
inadvertent or dictated by military necessity.213  On the Tonkin Gulf
209. Kaus, supra note 12, at 6.  Kaus adds, “virtually every bit of inside information he di-
vulges tends to make him look better rather than worse.  He is constantly ‘disturbed’ and
‘troubled’ by the war.  He highlights his own pessimistic memos (including one that, as Richard
Reeves has pointed out, he never got around to showing to President Johnson).”  Id.
210. See MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at 320-24, 332-33.
211. Halberstam, supra note 5.
212. Correll, supra note 208, at 2.
213. McNamara, supra note 3, at 105 (describing statements to press after return from De-
cember 1963 trip to Vietnam).  For instances of McNamara’s concession of his and the admini-
stration’s misleading statements or omissions, see, e.g., id. at 141 (stating that Dean Rusk mis-
led Senator William Fulbright regarding Tonkin Gulf Resolution and Lyndon Johnson
probably did as well); at 173 (administration authorizes regular bombing of North Vietnam but
declines to inform public); at 179-80 (recounting McNamara’s and others’ misleading Congres-
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incidents, he notes only one of his misstatements and testimonial
omissions to Congress, which he describes as “honest but wrong.”214
By contrast, Edwin Moïse, in his exhaustive study of the Tonkin Gulf
incidents, describes the story told by McNamara and General Earle
Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their briefing of
key senators on the first incident, as “false in almost every detail.”215
McNamara adds, “[t]he fundamental issue of Tonkin Gulf involved
not deception but, rather, misuse of power bestowed by the resolu-
tion.”216  Framing Tonkin Gulf in those terms, however, allows him to
wriggle off the hook of responsibility.  The decision to use the Tonkin
Gulf resolution as an open-ended authorization rested with Johnson,
and McNamara emphasizes his unsuccessful attempts to convince
Johnson to seek further Congressional approval as the war heated
up.217  Elsewhere, he writes: “Dean [Rusk] and I, and our associates,
gave frequent reports to Congress and the press.  Were they accu-
rate?  They were meant to be.  But with hindsight, the answer must
be that the reports—including my own—on the military situation
sional testimony in days following April 1, 1965 decision to change role of U.S. forces in Viet-
nam from defensive one of base security to active combat mission); at 205-06 (decision to es-
calate made secretly).  For examples of his excusing misstatements, see, e.g., id. at 47-48, 237
(blaming misstatements on South Vietnamese); at 105 (justifying lack of candor on military
grounds); at 137 (attributing his misstatements to Congressional leaders regarding first Tonkin
incident to honest mistakes).  For other, unacknowledged instances of McNamara’s misleading
Congress and the American people regarding Vietnam, see infra note 222.
214. MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at 137.  The asserted unprovoked North Vietnamese at-
tacks on U.S. destroyers led to Congressional adoption of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which
the Johnson administration came to read as an open-ended authorization for war.  See id.
215. EDWIN E. MOÏSE, TONKIN GULF AND THE ESCALATION OF THE VIETNAM WAR 87
(1996).  Moïse notes that some of the deception may have resulted from Johnson administra-
tion concerns about revealing military secrets and that as to some of what he said, McNamara
was himself misinformed, but Moïse does not absolve McNamara of all of his misstatements
then or now.  See id. at 86-89.
216. MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at 142.  He further argues that Congress understood that
the resolution granted the broad warmaking powers that Johnson subsequently exercised, but
that nonetheless the administration should not have used the resolution as a blank check.  He
argues that Congress had not believed that the administration would exercise such power with-
out further consultation with Congress.  See id. at 141-42.  He additionally seeks to bolster his
claim not to have willingly misled Congress by noting that in the February 1968 Senate hear-
ings to reexamine Tonkin Gulf, Senator Fulbright “graciously absolved me of the charge of
intentionally misleading Congress.”  Id. at 141.  For a skeptical view on the legal significance of
the administration’s deception, and an equally skeptical view of later congressional claims that
Congress was unaware of what the authorization entailed and how it might be used, see JOHN
HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS
AFTERMATH 15-26 (1993).
217. See MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at 200-01, 205-06.
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were often too optimistic.”218  Again, he admits error, but casts it as
honest mistake, rather than duplicity.  For this, incidentally, he holds
the American military and State Department essentially blameless,
and faults the South Vietnamese, instead.219  He also writes: “None of
us—not me, not the president, not Mac [McGeorge Bundy], nor
Dean, nor Max [Maxwell Taylor]—was ever satisfied with the infor-
mation we received from Vietnam.”220
This last quoted sentence prompted David Halberstam to write:
For McNamara to write so singularly dishonest a sentence 30 years
after the escalation of the war, in a book heralded as a mea culpa, is,
it seems to me, perilously close to a felony, and a sign that he is a
man so contorted and so deep in his own unique self-delusion and
self-division that he still doesn’t know who he is and what he did at
that time.221
Others have similarly reminded us that the lies told by the admini-
stration and McNamara were deliberate and frequent.222  It was not
only in the heat of the moment (and when caution and deliberation
would have mattered most) that McNamara banished all doubts
about whether the second, and far more important, Tonkin Gulf inci-
dent had occurred, and neglected to tell Congress that there was rea-
son to think that it had not.223  Years later, in other hearings before
218. Id. at 45-46.
219. See id. at 47-48.
220. Id. at 43.  McGeorge Bundy was National Security Advisor during the Kennedy and
part of the Johnson administrations.  Maxwell Taylor served in various capacities during the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations.  He was first the Special Military Advisor and then the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Kennedy administration; he then served as
U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam and as a close advisor to Johnson on Vietnam.
221. Halberstam, supra note 5.
222. Paul Hendrickson, for instance, notes a number of instances where In Retrospect is less
than candid about McNamara’s role in deceiving Congress, the press and the American people.
See HENDRICKSON, supra note 203, at 163-66, 168-71, 283-84, 310-12, 325-26.
223. An attack on the U.S. destroyer Maddox did occur on August 2, 1964, see GEORGE C.
HERRING, AMERICA’S LONGEST WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM, 1950-1975, at
133-35 (3d ed. 1996), under circumstances that McNamara was far “less than candid” in de-
scribing to Congress. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.  The August 4th “incident”  is
now generally regarded (even by McNamara, although not at the time he wrote In Retrospect)
as never having occurred.  See, e.g., MOÏSE, supra note 215, at 203-07; MARILYN B. YOUNG,
THE VIETNAM WARS 1945-1990, 115 (1991) (describing the August 2 attack as “the first and
only incident”).  Regarding the August 4 incident, Mose concludes: “the weight of the evi-
dence is overwhelming: no attack occurred.” MOÏSE, supra, at 204.  Whether the attack had oc-
curred was called into question by Captain Herrick, the commander of the Maddox, shortly
after it was reported.  Captain Herrick reported that much of the evidence of the “attack”
might have been attributable to “[f]reak weather effects on radar and overeager sonar men.”
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Congress he would continue to brush aside any doubts, and to beat
back Congressional questioning he would invoke the Pentagon’s
“unimpeachable,” but undisclosable, proof of the second attack.224  In
his study of the Tonkin Gulf incidents, Edwin Moïse characterizes
much of McNamara’s testimony in the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee February 1968 hearings on the Tonkin Gulf incidents as
“nonsense.”225  Nevertheless, no longer referring to the by-then-
discredited “unimpeachable” proof, McNamara asserts in In Retro-
spect that the second attack probably happened.226  His proof and
conviction that there had been an attack would subsequently evapo-
rate completely when, on a trip to Vietnam, McNamara credited
General Vo Nguyen Giap’s assurances that no second attack ever oc-
curred.227
For some, In Retrospect smacked too much of the old bullying
McNamara, who would face down the doubters and the challengers
with unshakable self-confidence and a flurry of asserted facts, statis-
tics and charts. The book inspired Martin Schram to recall
McNamara’s Thursday background briefings from 1967, a time long
after McNamara had concluded that the war was unwinnable:
The “SecDef,” with his trademark Harvard-honed counte-
nance—rimless spectacles, square-jutting jaw, slicked-back hair—
was at his trademark best: confident to the point of cocksure.
McNamara countered every question (Why is the enemy
fighting so fiercely, year after year, if we are doing so well in Viet-
MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at 133.  Within days of the supposed incident, many in the intelli-
gence community and the military concluded that no second attack occurred, as, by some ac-
counts, had President Johnson.  See MOÏSE, supra, at 199, 241-43.
224. See James A. Nathan, Robert McNamara’s Vietnam Deception, USA TODAY MAG.,
Sept. 1, 1995, at 32, 35.
225. MOÏSE, supra note 215, at 100.
226. See MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at 134; Nathan, supra note 224, at 32. Martin Schram
writes of this tendency of McNamara’s to dismiss all outward appearance of doubt and to dis-
miss likewise other people who doubted: “McNamara, when challenged, never seemed to have
a doubt about the rectitude of his policy or his course; damn the reality torpedoes, full steam
ahead.”  Martin Schram, McNamara Puts to Paper the Arrogance of Power, NEWSDAY, Apr.
14, 1995, at A36.
227. See Tim Larimer, In Hanoi, A Look Back at a Vietnam War Flash Point, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 1995, at A3; Keith B. Richburg, Mission to Hanoi; McNamara Asks Ex-Foes to Join in
Search for War’s Lessons, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 1995, at A21.  Even here a bit of autobio-
graphical revisionism was apparently afoot.  McNamara is reported to have stated that he
found Giap’s assurance that nothing had occurred on August 4, 1964, “very, very convincing”
and that this confirmed his own suspicions.  He added, “I am prepared to say, without a doubt
there was no second attack.”  Id.; see also MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at xvii, 128.
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nam?) with a rapid-fire barrage of certitude-by-the-numbers.  More
stats than a scribe could scribble, let alone verify.  And that was the
point.  It was McNamara’s not-so-secret plan to win his weekly war
with the media.  McNamara kept his opposition pinned down with
his arsenal of statistics that proved beyond question that the war was
being won (as we would see after the next monsoons).228
Other critics point to instances of McNamara’s responsibility
that In Retrospect simply ignores.  McNamara, for instance, bemoans
the absence of Far Eastern experts within the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations (which he attributes with some justification to the
McCarthy-era purge of Asian experts from the State Department),
and he attributes his and his colleagues’ failure to understand China
and Vietnam and U.S. interests in Southeast Asia to the resulting
lack of expertise.  When the warmakers made mistakes, corrective
voices were consequently nowhere to be heard.229  He makes no men-
tion of his role in suppressing the dissenting voices that did exist
within the administrations and in attacking and isolating those who
had the temerity to question the assumptions and wisdom of the
warmakers.230 McNamara identifies three moments when “we could
228. Schram, supra note 226.  In The Best and the Brightest, David Halberstam recounts
how McNamara would spring savage ambushes on George Ball in meetings with the President
where Ball would advocate caution and McNamara argued for escalation.  Halberstam writes:
McNamara was a ferocious infighter, statistics and force ratios came pouring out of
him like a great uncapped faucet.  He had total control of his facts and he was quick
and nimble with them; there was never a man better with numbers, he could charac-
terize enemy strength and movement and do it statistically.
Poor George had no counterfigures; he would talk in vague doubts, lacking
these figures, and leave the meetings occasionally depressed and annoyed.  Why did
McNamara have such good figures?  Why did McNamara have such good staff work
and Ball such poor staff work?  The next day Ball would angrily dispatch his staff to
come up with the figures, to find out how McNamara had gotten them, and the staff
would burrow away and occasionally find that one of the reasons that Ball did not
have comparable figures was that they did not always exist.  McNamara had invented
them . . . . He believed in what he did, and thus the morality of it was assured, and
everything else fell into place.  It was all right to lie and dissemble for the right
causes.  It was part of service, loyalty to the President, not to the nation, not to col-
leagues, it was a very special bureaucratic-corporate definition of integrity; you could
do almost anything you wanted as long as it served your superior.
DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST 581 (3d ed. 1972).
229. See MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at 32-33.  For further discussion of this point see infra
notes 250-54 and accompanying text.
230. See Thomas L. Hughes, Experiencing McNamara, FOREIGN POL’Y, Fall 1995, at 155,
165-66 (reviewing MCNAMARA, supra note 3); Kaus, supra note 12, at 6; Louis Sarris,
McNamara’s War, and Mine, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1995, at A17; Louis Sarris, Weekend Edi-
tion—Saturday: Interview with Scott Simon (National Public Radio broadcast, Sept. 9, 1995).  In
this regard see also HALBERSTAM, supra note 228, at 58 (recounting how McNamara would
quash the dissenting voice of George Ball).  For McNamara’s response to Louis Sarris, see
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and should have withdrawn from South Vietnam:” late 1963 after
Diem’s assassination; late 1964; and early 1965, as South Vietnam
seemed on the verge of political and military collapse.231  Thomas
Hughes writes of these three moments: “As it happens, in each case
analytical arguments were made and widely distributed, and in each
case they were ignored or rejected.  McNamara himself was front and
center bringing all of his bloodless decisiveness to bear in snuffing
out any incipient withdrawal temptations.”232
Myra McPherson reminds her readers of two “scandals” of the
Vietnam War that pass unnoticed in In Retrospect: Project 100,000,
and the use of Agent Orange (and subsequent refusal to reveal
known health risks of the toxin) as a defoliant in Vietnam.233  Project
100,000 was McNamara’s plan to lower military enlistment require-
ments (they had already been lowered dramatically from pre-war
levels) in an effort to recruit from the inner cities and poor rural ar-
eas 100,000 men per year who otherwise would have been ineligible
for military service.234  The program lowered the minimum passing
score on the armed forces qualification test from 31 out of 100 to 10
out of 100 for would-be recruits living in designated poverty areas.235
Billed as a Great Society uplift program, which promised education
and training to these marginal recruits, the program in fact delivered
little training to these men, dubbed the “moron corps” or
“McNamara’s boys,” (McNamara, himself, called them the
“subterranean poor”) aside from the infantry training necessary to
put them disproportionately in combat roles in Vietnam,  and in body
bags returning home.236  The Project further exacerbated the tendency
of the selective service’s class-biased channeling policy, which al-
lowed for student deferments, medical exemptions that were widely
available to those sufficiently well-informed and privileged to take
advantage of them, and possible evasion by service in the reserves or
Robert McNamara, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1995, at A26.  David Halber-
stam’s account of the Sarris affair in The Best and the Brightest is consistent with Sarris’ version
in the New York Times, and with the more general characterization of McNamara as an ac-
complished bureaucratic infighter when it came to silencing dissenting voices. See HAL-
BERSTAM, supra note 228, at 257-58.
231. MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at 320.
232. Hughes, supra note 230, at 159.
233. See Myra MacPherson, McNamara’s ‘Other’ Crimes: The Stories You Haven’t Heard,
WASH. MONTHLY, June 1995, at 28.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 28-29.
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National Guard, open to the savvy and the connected, to ensure that
the war would be what Christian Appy has quite properly called a
“working-class war.”237
As Secretary of Defense, McNamara attended meetings where
the health risks of Agent Orange were discussed, yet he remained si-
lent as veterans sought help for health effects that might be the result
of their exposures to the defoliant.238  McNamara’s Defense Depart-
ment had commissioned a study as early as 1967 which noted the
“health dangers” of Agent Orange to human beings, yet in his book,
McNamara remains silent about his knowledge of these toxic ef-
fects.239
Adherents of the revisionist view that the war was winnable if
the civilians in Washington had not made the military “fight with one
arm tied behind its back,” fault McNamara for confessing the wrong
sins.240  We were not “wrong, terribly wrong,” to be in Vietnam, they
contend.  Rather, we were wrong to fight a war that we did not per-
mit the military to win. In editorials, columns, letters to the editor,
and traffic over the Internet, the civilian war managers, and espe-
237. CHRISTIAN G. APPY, WORKING-CLASS WAR: AMERICAN COMBAT SOLDIERS AND
VIETNAM 11 (1993).  On Project 100,000 and the other means by which the selective service
law and practice turned the Vietnam-era military into a working-class military see id. at 11-38;
LAWRENCE M. BASKIR & WILLIAM A. STRAUSS, CHANCE AND CIRCUMSTANCE: THE DRAFT,
THE WAR, AND THE VIETNAM GENERATION 122-31 (1978).  Appy notes that prior to 1965 men
who scored in the bottom two categories of the military’s mental examination (categories IV
and V) were rarely accepted into the military.  “Beginning in 1965, however, hundreds of thou-
sands of category IV men were drafted.  Most were from poor and broken families, 80 percent
were high school dropouts, and half had IQs of less than eighty-five.” APPY, supra, at 31.  Re-
jection rates were slashed, falling from 50% in 1965 to 34% the following year.  See id. at 32.
Project 100,000 was designed to admit men who could not qualify even under these lowered
standards.  Appy notes:
The effect of Project 100,000 was dire.  The promised training was never carried out.
Of the 240,000 men inducted by Project 100,000 from 1966 to 1968, only 6 percent
received additional training, and this amounted to little more than an effort to raise
reading skills to a fifth grade level.  Forty percent were trained for combat, compared
with only 25 percent for all enlisted men.  Also, while blacks comprised 10 percent of
the entire military, they represented about 40 percent of the Project 100,000 soldiers.
A 1970 Defense Department study estimates that roughly half of the almost 400,000
men who entered the military under Project 100,000 were sent to Vietnam.  These
men had a death rate twice as high as American forces as a whole.  This was a Great
Society program that was quite literally shot down on the battlefields of Vietnam.
Id. at 32-33.
238. See MacPherson, supra note 233, at 29.
239. Id. (quoting Judge George Pratt, Jr.’s comments on evidence discovered in Vietnam
veterans’ lawsuit against Dow Chemical for conspiring to hide the truth about dioxin).
240. The Vietnam War; A Truth Too Late, supra note 198.  Representative works in this
revisionist tradition are GEN. BRUCE PALMER, JR., THE 25-YEAR WAR (1984); COL. HARRY
G. SUMMERS, JR., ON STRATEGY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE VIETNAM WAR (1982).
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cially McNamara, have been condemned for their
“micromanagement” of the war, their unwillingness to let the military
experts do what they were trained to do, and their insistence on a
limited war.241  In Retrospect, they argue, is further proof that
McNamara’s heart was not in the effort, and that his timidity led to
defeat.
An enduring measure of the adequacy of a person’s confession
has been his willingness to accept personal responsibility without
shifting the blame onto others, or onto circumstances that excuse or
mitigate his act.  Both in Puritan New England and under the Sen-
tencing Guidelines, failure to accept complete personal responsibility
has been fatal to claims of penitence.242  Perhaps the biggest gap in
McNamara’s confession is his failure to recognize those who were
harmed most by his acts: the rank and file servicemen and the Viet-
namese.  Each gets scant notice, and some of McNamara’s critics take
him to task for one or both of these omissions.243  They see
McNamara’s confession as a manipulative effort simultaneously to
garner the accolades due an unrelentingly honest and self-critical
penitent and to soften the self-inflicted sting of confession.  He seeks
the communal adulation of an Esther Rodgers at the gallows, without
having to ascend the gallows steps.244
241. See, e.g., Gen. Robert W. Bazley (Ret.), Letter to the Editor, A.F. MAG., Sept. 1995, at
9; Correll, supra note 205, at 2; Fisher, Memoir, supra note 205; Kolbe, supra note 7; Col. Felix
Kozaczka (Ret.), Letter to the Editor, A.F. MAG., Sept. 1995, at 9; Darrell R. Schreiber, Feeble
Try at Self-Exoneration, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 29, 1995, at B4; Ann Sheridan,
Letter to the Editor, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1995, at B2; Col. Larry C. Souder (Ret.), Letter to
the Editor, A.F. MAG., Sept. 1995, at 9; see also supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
242. Recall Increase Mather’s warning to the two convicted murderers who each claimed
that the other struck the fatal blow.  See supra text accompanying note 53; see also supra notes
133-34 (noting the hostility of modern judges applying the Sentencing Guidelines to defendants
who attempt to excuse their behavior or shift a portion of the blame onto others).
243. See, e.g., Leonard Bushkoff, Robert McNamara Faces History and Himself on Vietnam
After Decades of Silence, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 17, 1995, at 13 (book review) (noting
McNamara’s seeming lack of interest in Vietnam, its society, and its politics); Correll, supra
note 208, at 2 (“In the entire book, there are just four brief instances, one of them in a footnote,
when the troops cross his mind.”); Fertel, supra note 6; Harry Maurer, McNamara Speaks—But
Still Doesn’t See, BUSINESS WK., May 1, 1995, at 19 (book review); Richard Reeves, War Sto-
ries: Robert McNamara Comes Clean on Vietnam, WASH. MONTHLY, Apr. 1995, at 52 (book
review).  For further discussion of the these omissions, see infra text accompanying notes 269-
71.
244. Mickey Kaus captures this spirit in his book review, in which he notes that the inside
information that McNamara’s book reveals tends to cast McNamara as “disturbed” and
“troubled” by the war.  Kaus is a voice of restraint and caution.  See Kaus, supra note 12, at 6.
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In a review dripping with acid (in which he likens McNamara to
Hitler’s arms minister Albert Speer), Victor Gold accuses McNamara
of a “postmodern” confessional two-step: “first, mea culpa and get
the PR benefits thereof; then, let it be known that there were excul-
patory circumstances.”245  Gold notes that McNamara assigns blame
widely: to Eisenhower, for leaving the Indochina mess and the dom-
ino theory to Kennedy and for counseling Johnson to hang tough and
even use nuclear weapons, if necessary; to Joe McCarthy, for causing
the purge of East Asian experts from government leaving the Ken-
nedy and Johnson administrations operating, in McNamara’s words,
in “a region that was terra incognita;”246 to Barry Goldwater, for
forcing Johnson to be more bellicose during the 1964 presidential
campaign; and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their congressional
hawk allies, for wanting to “bomb Hanoi back to the Stone Age” de-
spite McNamara’s cautionary advice.247
Some of the criticism in this regard makes unreasonable de-
mands of McNamara.  Echoing the general insistence under the Sen-
tencing Guidelines that the defendant accept full responsibility per-
sonally, some critics fault McNamara for sharing the blame with his
fellow policymakers.  Martin Schram contemptuously calls In Retro-
spect a “we-a-culpa.”248  Of course, notwithstanding McNamara’s role
as a major architect of the war, Vietnam was a collective effort and
any honest effort on McNamara’s part to document and explain the
decisionmaking for intervention and escalation would reflect this
collective character.  Indeed, had he really done what Schram ap-
pears to ask of him, Schram and others would have accused him of
displaying the famous McNamara arrogance.249
McNamara’s “lack of expertise” excuse merits some discussion.
McNamara correctly states that the Kennedy and Johnson admini-
strations lacked China and East Asia experts of the same stature of
Llewellyn Thompson, Charles Bohlen, and George Kennan, the So-
245. Gold, supra note 7, at 67.
246. MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at 32.
247. Gold, supra note 7, at 67.
248. Schram, supra note 226; see also Zuzel, supra note 11 (“[Y]ou are being modest when
you say, as you did in a radio interview last weekend, that ‘we were terribly wrong’ about Viet-
nam.  In fact, Mr. McNamara, it was you.  You were terribly wrong.  We didn’t call it
‘McNamara’s War’ for nothing.”).
249. Schram accuses him of the sin of arrogance, partially because Schram thinks he has not
acknowledged sufficient individual responsibility.  Sometimes one is damned regardless of his
choices.  For further discussion of McNamara’s inability to curb his arrogance in In Retrospect,
see supra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
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viet experts whom President Kennedy was able to turn to during the
Cuban Missile Crisis.250  And he properly attributes this vacuum to
the McCarthy-era purges of the China experts held responsible for
“losing” that country.  Nevertheless, he has overstated the unavail-
ability of expertise in a manner that not only smacks of apologia, but
also reveals the persistence of other character traits that undermine
the effectiveness of his confession.  At the cabinet and sub-cabinet
level were Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who had served as Tru-
man’s Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East and was then
viewed as a China expert, Under Secretary of State George Ball,
who, as counsel to the French embassy during the French war in
Vietnam, was intimately aware of the dangers of intervention, and
Kennedy’s first Under Secretary of State, Chester Bowles, who had
served as ambassador to India.251  Does McNamara really believe that
the lack of East Asian expertise around the cabinet table and at the
most senior levels within the State Department meant that no such
expertise was available?  What he failed to appreciate then, and ap-
parently now, is that the grey eminences of foreign policy do not hold
a monopoly on either knowledge or wisdom.  Yet, voices of caution
and dissent from within the administration and the military were
squelched or ignored and their owners often punished.252  Those from
outside of government were similarly ignored when they were not
ridiculed and villainized.253
Here we see McNamara’s characteristic arrogance shine through
the contrition.  For McNamara, real expertise can only be found at
the upper reaches of the foreign policy hierarchy where the best and
the brightest reside.  In fact, however, both within and without gov-
ernment, others had little trouble figuring out that our intervention
250. See MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at 32.
251. See HALBERSTAM, supra note 228, at 35 (Bowles); id. at 173-75 (Ball); id. at 321-30
(Rusk); MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at 156-58 (discussing George Ball).  For a discussion of
Bowles and his concerns regarding America’s involvement in Vietnam, see also DAVID
BURNER & THOMAS R. WEST, THE TORCH IS PASSED: THE KENNEDY BROTHERS AND
AMERICAN LIBERALISM 103-04 (1984); HERRING, supra note 223, at 90-91.
252. See Fertel, supra note 6 (mentioning John Paul Vann, a colonel whose in-country re-
porting could have “seriously controverted the overly optimistic position [of] the defense de-
partment”); Herring, supra note 4, at 153 (“Even the available expertise was difficult to get to
the top.  And when it got to the top, such as State Department official Paul Kattenburg’s criti-
cism in the Kennedy years, it was ignored.”); Hughes, supra note 230, at 164 (“The real-life
effect of McNamara on the bureaucracy was regularly one of intimidation, hobbling if not si-
lencing those in government who were prescient on Vietnam.”); Mr. McNamara’s War, supra
note 13; see also supra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
253. See Kaplan, supra note 197; Mr. McNamara’s War, supra note 13.
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was wrong, both in the strategic terms to which McNamara limits his
confession, and, more importantly, in moral terms.254  This arrogance
and elitism comes through also in McNamara’s discussions of antiwar
protesters and the peace movement.  He writes of the protests he en-
countered as he garnered honorary degrees in 1966:
What disturbed me most during my campus visits was the realization
that opposition to the administration’s Vietnam policy increased
with the institution’s prestige and the educational attainment of its
students.  At Amherst, those protesting my presence wore arm-
bands.  I counted the number and calculated the percentage of pro-
testers in each of four groups: graduates, cum laude graduates,
magna cum laude graduates, and summa cum laude graduates.  To
my consternation, the percentages rose with the level of academic
distinction.  Some of the largest and most intense campus demon-
strations occurred at premier institutions such as Berkeley and Stan-
ford.255
In response, Murray Kempton writes: “For McNamara then and
perhaps still the judgments of his fellow creatures exist to be ac-
cepted or dismissed according to the scale of the Preliminary Scholas-
tic Aptitude Text.”256  A particularly ugly moment in the book is
McNamara’s derisive characterization of the antiwar protesters at the
October 1967 march on the Pentagon, and his suggestion that he
could have organized a more effective demonstration: one in which
more “disciplined-Gandhi-like” protesters would have succeeded in
shutting down the Pentagon.257  In place of the humility that Puritan
divines looked for in the penitent criminal, we see the McNamara
who is driven to show that he is smarter than his critics.
254. Leonard Bushkoff writes: “If expertise mattered so much, how could such obvious
amateurs as, for example, Robert Lowell, I.F. Stone, or the New York Review of Books get it
right as early as 1965, while McNamara and the other best and brightest continued to get it
wrong?”  Bushkoff, supra note 243, at 13.
255. MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at 253-54.
256. Murray Kempton, When “Smart” People Wage War, NEWSDAY, Apr. 16, 1995, at A29.
257. MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at 303-05.  In an interview with Paul Hendrickson discuss-
ing the same protest the lack of humility shines through more brightly:
‘They did it all wrong . . . . The way to have done it would to have been Gandhi-like.
Had they retained their discipline, they could have achieved their ends.  My God, if
fifty thousand people had been disciplined and I had been the leader I absolutely
guarantee you I could have shut down the whole goddamn place.  You see, they
didn’t set up proper procedures for maximizing the force of the day.’
HENDRICKSON, supra note 203, at 300.  For additional critical reaction to this discussion, see
Kaus, supra note 12.
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Remorseful words alone were not sufficient in Puritan New
England, as they often do not suffice under the Sentencing Guide-
lines.  Esther Rodgers and other penitents were expected to show
“the truth of repentance” through their humble embrace of punish-
ment and other acts of willing cooperation with authorities.258  Simi-
larly, courts have declined to grant the acceptance of responsibility
adjustment when the defendant behaves inconsistently with his as-
serted remorse.  In Retrospect’s critics complain that McNamara fails
to demonstrate the truth of repentance.  They find him lacking in
humility, and hold extraordinary his attempt to position himself as a
rehabilitated elder statesman teaching as profundities “lessons” that
others had learned long ago.259  Many are agog at McNamara’s sur-
prise during his book promotion tour that his audience came not to
ask him about the lessons of Vietnam or nuclear disarmament, but to
confront him with their pain or to press him to enough self-revelation
that they might catch a glimpse of the truth of his repentance.260
The pervasive sense that words alone do not suffice, at least at
this late hour, underlies the most common reaction to the book.  The
notion that the penitent must do more than confess, but must in fact
help to mitigate the harm that she has done, can be found both in the
conventions of the criminal conversion narratives and in the decisions
explicating the Sentencing Guidelines.  This notion is echoed by the
critical consensus that McNamara is too late.  Why, the critics ask,
did McNamara keep silent as the war ground on, as lives were lost or
damaged on both sides and as two nations (more, really) suffered the
consequences, each in its own way, of a wrong war?261
B. The Meaning of McNamara’s Confession
What is there to have pangs of conscience at night about with Viet-
nam?262
258. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
259. See, e.g., Correll, supra note 208, at 2; Fertel, supra note 6; Editorial, “McNamara’s
War” Was Aptly Named,  PHOENIX GAZETTE, Apr. 12, 1995, at B4; Reeves, supra note 243, at
54.
260. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 204.
261. See Drinan, supra note 8, at 24; Guilt, with an Explanation, NEWSDAY, Apr. 16, 1995,
at A31; Halberstam, supra note 5; and sources cited supra note 198.
262. Kissinger Interview with Theo Sommer, DIE ZEIT, July 2, 1976, quoted in WILLIAM
SHAWCROSS, SIDESHOW: KISSINGER, NIXON AND THE DESTRUCTION OF CAMBODIA 394
(1981).  This quotation was brought to my attention by ELY, supra note 216, at 12.  Normally, I
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O how hard it is to Repent. . . . Oh!  Turn whilst the Day of Grace
lasts.263
Qui s’accuse s’excuse.264
So what do Robert McNamara and Esther Rodgers have in
common besides the blood of innocents on their hands?  Both have
admitted wrongs.  There can be little doubt that McNamara has suf-
fered real anguish over his role and his mistakes.  Yet few people
consider McNamara a good prospect for sainthood.
It is hard to make an independent judgment about Esther Rodg-
ers’s repentance and conversion.  We can only know as much as
Rogers’s volume tells us, and we should be careful to approach that
account with skepticism.  We know far more about McNamara and
about the events that he recounts, and the conclusion is unavoidable
that, despite all his agony and regret, In Retrospect is a dishonest
book.
Alfred Kazin has described autobiography as an effort “to make
one’s own experience come out right.”265  The impulse to cast one’s
self in the best possible light (or at least to soften one’s self-criticism
and preemptively deflect the criticism of others) and to try to correct
the errors of one’s life in the telling is inevitable, and much of this oc-
curs unconsciously: McNamara displays these tendencies in In Retro-
spect in his understatement of his role as architect of the war, in the
emphasis on his anguished, internal, and early dissent, in the book’s
portrayal of the power of the forces pressing for ever more escala-
tion, wider and more massive bombing and greater military and dip-
lomatic stridency as nearly irresistible, but held partly at bay by
McNamara, and in its omissions and denials of disagreeable facts,
only some of which are discussed above.
McNamara’s narrative exemplifies the battle of memory against
the messiness of the past.  Confronted with a divided self, he con-
structs, instead, a simpler, coherent story that glosses over those divi-
would not filch someone else’s opening quotation, but I doubt a more fitting one exists for my
purposes here.
263. ROGERS, supra note 23, at 148 (quoting Esther Rodgers).
264. A French proverb, roughly translated as: “One who accuses himself, excuses himself.”
Peter Brooks, Storytelling Without Fear? Confession in Law & Literature, 8 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 1, 14 (1996).
265. Alfred Kazin, The Self as History: Reflections on Autobiography (1979), reprinted  in
THE AMERICAN AUTOBIOGRAPHY: A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS, 31, 35 (Albert E.
Stone ed., 1981).
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sions.  His exuberance about the war and about American power, his
“organization man” loyalty to the president and concomitant willing-
ness to attack critics of the organizational “consensus,” and his com-
mitment to a strategy of attrition, with its horrific consequences for
the Vietnamese, coexisted with a growing doubt that led him to be at
once a cautious (and for a long time closeted) dove and can-do hawk.
As McNamara relates, his doubts emerged in late 1965 (when the die
had already been cast—although not necessarily irretrievably) after
the North Vietnamese fought more effectively and with greater force
than anticipated in the battle of the Ia Drang Valley, thereby calling
into question American assumptions about the war.266  Yet, having
now resolved this division within himself in favor of McNamara the
dove, he projects this victory back in time and thereby smoothes out
the contradictions within himself and his past.  Upon his return from
Vietnam after the Ia Drang Valley battle, McNamara wrote his first
of many pessimistic memoranda to the President.  In it he outlined
two options: a political compromise on fairly undesirable terms, or
escalation of the air and land wars with even odds that it would pro-
duce nothing more than a stalemate at a higher level of engagement.
McNamara writes of this November 30, 1965 memo that he “did not
state a preference between these two unhappy options.”267  This in-
terpretation reflects McNamara’s self-delusion in his effort to tame
his past.  He cannot seriously expect to fool anyone but himself on
this matter, since George Herring had previously reviewed this
document and revealed that, notwithstanding his doubts, McNamara
did indeed advocate escalation in the memo as “the best chance of
achieving our stated objectives.”268
Indeed, biographer Deborah Shapley, who interviewed
McNamara over twenty times during the late 1980s and early 1990s,
266. See MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at 221-22.  The American forces won a decisive victory,
albeit with heavy casualties, but, as McNamara notes, the “North Vietnamese had chosen
where, when, and how long to fight.”  They also inflicted heavy casualties and demonstrated
that they were capable of raising a much greater force than anticipated.  See id.  For the most
extensive discussion of McNamara as a man divided, see generally HENDRICKSON, supra note
203.
267. See MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at 223.
268. George C. Herring, The Strange “Dissent” of Robert S. McNamara, in THE VIETNAM
WAR: VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 140, 142 (Jayne S. Werner & Luu Doan
Huynh eds., 1993) (quoting Robert S. McNamara, Memorandum for the President (Nov. 30,
1965), Lyndon Baines Johnson Papers, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Vietnam, Box 75).
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found his dovish views to be far more inchoate as recently as 1993.269
She further notes that during her interviews he explained his failure
to act more forcefully on his doubts about the war as the product of
his uncertainty that his doubts were well-founded.270 He has paid a
price for this projection of current conclusions onto his past in the
heightened outrage over the contradiction between his apparent si-
lent loss of faith in the war and his continued management of the war.
Should the point be lost on any of his readers, he includes a chart that
shows the troop levels and the number of Americans killed in action
at various moments when we might have ended our involvement.271
McNamara, ever the control freak, attempts to order this past
with his usual tools: charts, statistics, and lists of lessons, as well as
with an account that imposes order and banishes his ambivalences
and contradictions, along with most of his feelings and emotions.  Ex-
cept for the rare anecdote or moment of insight where those feelings
break through, this is a corpse-cold account.  It is the triumph of in-
tellect over emotion.  Here he stands in striking contrast to Esther
Rodgers, who felt her past and recounted it with an obvious intensity.
But McNamara is still divided.  At times he is penitent, but at
other moments he is defensive and apologetic.  This division tends to
manifest itself on the one hand in a genuine desire to figure out how
and when mistakes were made.  That is McNamara the analyst.  But
he still demonstrates the need to be smarter than everyone else, to
bully and pulverize his critics, to always be right.  Mickey Kaus notes
the contradiction: “McNamara wants to both claim that he was right
and get credit for admitting he was wrong.”272  Repeatedly, as
McNamara recounts the extraordinary moral and strategic folly of his
destructive war, he notes the dedication, brilliance, and other superb
qualities of his colleagues (and by implication, of himself) who with
him made the war.273  Missing from his discussion is any similar gen-
269. See Deborah Shapley, McNamara’s Inner War, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, July-Aug.
1995, at 13-14.
270. See id. at 15.
271. See MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at 321.
272. Kaus, supra note 12, at 6.
273. Thus, McGeorge Bundy “possesses one of the keenest intellects I have ever encoun-
tered . . . [and] was by far the ablest national security adviser I have observed over the last forty
years.”  MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at 95.  And this man who was “wrong, terribly wrong,”
“brought to government service a highly disciplined mind of extraordinary quality and an in-
sistence that we focus on the fundamental foreign policy issues confronting our nation, however
difficult they might be.”  MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at 235 (emphasis added).  Bundy’s re-
placement as National Security Advisor, Walt Rostow, was “an extraordinarily bright man with
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erosity with regard to those who despite the administrations’ lies and
obfuscations were all too terribly right: the antiwar movement and
Senator Wayne Morse, who, with Senator Ernest Gruening of
Alaska, cast the only “no” votes on the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.274
This division revealed itself, as well, in the inevitable confronta-
tions on McNamara’s book promotion tour.  At one moment he
would pull out and tearfully read a letter from Anne Morrison Welsh,
the widow of Norman Morrison, who self-immolated in protest of the
war not far from McNamara’s Pentagon office window.  The letter
thanks McNamara for writing the book.275  At the next moment, we
see ugly flashes of the old McNamara who, when asked by an angry
Vietnam veteran why his friends had to die in a war that McNamara
did not believe in, responds: “You’re going to have to read the book
to get the answer,” and when further pressed by the veteran, tells him
to “Shut Up!” before launching into a lecture about the domino the-
ory.276
a warm personality and an open approach with his colleagues.”  Id.  McNamara also notes
Bundy brother Bill’s “integrity and intelligence,” and adds that Assistant Secretary of State Bill
Bundy “was one of my most trusted advisers on Vietnam.”  Id. at 103.  General Maxwell Tay-
lor, Kennedy’s military adviser, and later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ambassador to
South Vietnam, and special adviser to President Johnson on Vietnam, “was the wisest uni-
formed geopolitician and security adviser I ever met.” Id. at 54.  He also notes his “deep re-
spect and affection for [Secretary of State] Dean [Rusk].” Id. at 95.  One is left to wonder how
the second string could have botched matters much more badly.
274. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.  For McNamara’s rather shabby discussion
of Morse in which he fails to mention that Morse was essentially right, notwithstanding admini-
stration deception, see MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at 136-37.
275. See Goodman, supra note 204.  Morrison’s death clearly affected McNamara, and he
discusses it briefly in In Retrospect, see MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at 216-17.  For more on
Norman Morrison and Anne Morrison Welsh, see HENDRICKSON, supra note 203, at 187-240.
276. Such a confrontation occurred at a public forum at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School
of Government.  The story was disseminated nationally.  According to one news account:
John Hurley, who identified himself as a Vietnam veteran, told McNamara that his
book was an “obscenity.”  He then asked: “Why did my commander Burt Bunting
die when you knew that the war was a mistake?  Why did McNally die?  Why did
Kirkendall die?  Why did they die, sir?  Why did you remain silent while another
57,000 American troops and 4 million Vietnamese troops died?  Why?”
McNamara: “You’re going to have to read the book to get the answer . . . .”
Hurley: “Sir, sir . . . .”
McNamara: “Wait a minute!  Shut up!” (Loud gasp from the audience.)  “Let me an-
swer.  This is a very important question. . . . In 1965 it was believed by senior military
officers and by the CIA and by senior officials in the U.S. Government and other
governments that the loss of Vietnam to the Communists would lead to the loss of all
of Asia and to a catastrophic war.  We were trying to use military pressure to move
North Vietnam to negotiate to permit an independent South Vietnam that would
stop the advance of Chinese and Soviet Communists.  And that’s why the war went
on.  As I’ve said in the book, I thought we were wrong.”
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Robert McNamara’s slow and obviously anguished process of
coming to terms with his role in the Vietnam War reminds us that the
penitent’s struggle is hard and continuing.  Recall that Esther Rodg-
ers’s path was also difficult and that she traversed it only with an out-
pouring of help from her community and the prospects of eternal suf-
fering beyond the gallows.  For McNamara, for reasons discussed
below, no such assistance exists.
McNamara’s confession and conversion also differ from Rodg-
ers’s in their theological worldview and vocabulary.  Unlike Rodgers,
McNamara writes in secular terms, and he resists revealing enough
about his inner self to identify any religious wellsprings that may be a
source of his conversion.  This, of course, is not surprising.  We live in
very different times from Esther Rodgers.  Yet, we should not be so
quick to dismiss the religious meanings of In Retrospect.  Specifically,
it is useful to consider and elaborate an insight of church historian
James Bratt, who notes the problem of bad faith in the book.  The
charge of bad faith might be leveled at the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations for misleading the American people, and at
McNamara for falling short of a completely honest account of his
past.  Bratt insists that we consider “bad faith” in a second sense, the
worship of false gods, and specifically the “idolatry of reason, nation
and numbers.”277  This is a charge that the Puritan divines would
readily have understood and identified by the same name, although
the idolatry that concerned them most was the worship of worldly
things and wealth.278
While he never charges into the temple to smash the idols, at In
Retrospect’s best moments McNamara does break loose from his bad
faith.  While opponents of the war might justifiably respond to many
of McNamara’s eleven enumerated “major causes for our disaster in
Vietnam,”279 with a collective “duh,” it still represents a victory of
sorts when he writes that: “We [mistakenly] viewed the people and
leaders of South Vietnam in terms of our own experience;”280 “[w]e
Walsh, supra note 205, at 9.  Such confrontations must have been fairly common during the
book promotion tour, although McNamara’s reaction at Harvard may not have been.  See
Berger, supra note 205.
277. James Bratt, Dreams of Vietnam: Robert McNamara and the New Minutemen, 112
CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1019, 1019 (1995) (book review).
278. See RICHARD L. BUSHMAN, FROM PURITAN TO YANKEE: CHARACTER AND THE
SOCIAL ORDER IN CONNECTICUT, 1690-1765, at 23-25, 188-90, 192-93 (1967).
279. See MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at 321-23.
280. Id. at 322.
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failed to recognize that in international affairs, as in other aspects of
life, there may be problems for which there are no immediate solu-
tions;”281 and “[w]e do not have the God-given right to shape every
nation in our own image or as we choose.”282  Mostly, however, he
remains enchanted by these false gods.
McNamara was, of course, infamously infatuated with numbers,
a corporate bean-counter, the systems-analyst par excellence, rightly
dubbed homo mathematicus.283  There is nothing intrinsically wrong
with quantification.  But an emphasis on counting and numbers can
obscure both what is being counted and what really matters.284  And
numerical yardsticks of success in a setting where the numbers are
inherently unreliable can create terrible incentives to cook the books,
leaving one with only “an illusion of knowledge.”285  Such was the
case in Vietnam.  In The Best and the Brightest David Halberstam
captures the tragi-comic character of this quest for numerical control
of disorderly Vietnamese realities in his description of a military
briefing in 1965:
One particular visit seemed to sum it up: McNamara looking for the
war to fit his criteria, his definitions.  He went to Danang in 1965 to
check on the Marine progress there.  A Marine colonel in I Corps
had a sand table showing the terrain and patiently gave the briefing:
friendly situation, enemy situation, main problem. McNamara
watched it, not really taking it in, his hands folded, frowning a little,
finally interrupting.  “Now let me see,” McNamara said, “if I have it
right, this is your situation,” and then he spouted his own version, all
281. Id. at 323.
282. Id.
283. Paul Hendrickson dubbed McNamara homo mathematicus.  See HENDRICKSON, supra
note 203, at 24.
284. Christian Appy writes:
[E]very act or event deemed relevant to the American cause was quantified and duly
recorded, or to put it differently, if an event could not be quantified, it was simply not
considered relevant.  But virtually everything that could be counted was . . . . The
command chronologies and after-action reports are filled with long lists of these fig-
ures.  The numbers appear without comment or emphasis, statistics on candy bars
and ponchos appearing alongside numbers of refugees “generated” or wounded sol-
diers evacuated.
There was in all of the quantification a laughable pretense of precision.  Could,
for example, a battalion really know that it had lost exactly fifty-two tent pins on an
operation?  Even if such figures were accurate, which of them is truly important, and
in what larger context might we understand their significance?  Such questions were
hardly, if ever, asked.
APPY, supra note 237, at 157.
285. HALBERSTAM, supra note 228, at 249.
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in numbers and statistics.  The colonel, who was very bright, read
him immediately like a man breaking a code, and without changing
stride, went on with the briefing, simply switching his terms, quanti-
fying everything, giving everything in numbers and percentages, per-
centages up, percentages down, so blatant a performance that it was
like a satire.  Jack Raymond of the New York Times began to laugh
and had to leave the tent.  Later that day Raymond went up to
McNamara and commented on how tough the situation was up in
Danang, but McNamara wasn’t interested in the Vietcong, he
wanted to talk about that colonel, he liked him, that colonel had
caught his eye.  “That colonel is one of the finest officers I’ve ever
met,” he said.286
Those who lived through the period remember well the flurry of
statistics in McNamara’s press briefings: the enemy’s order of battle;
sorties flown; numbers of bombs dropped; targets destroyed in the
North; traffic from the North down the Ho Chi Minh Trail; enemy
trucks destroyed; kill ratios; enemies captured and deserted; weapons
lost ratios; American and South Vietnamese losses; and the body
count.287  It is that last bit of numerology that is most enduringly asso-
ciated with McNamara, and his continued defense of its use shows,
perhaps better than anything else in In Retrospect, how little he un-
derstands his past, and how much he remains transfixed under the
spell of his false gods.
McNamara writes that his critics pointed to the body count “as
an example of my obsession with numbers.”288  He responds that
while some things, such as honor and beauty, defy quantification,
“things you can count, you ought to count.”289  Enemy dead is one
such measurable thing.  In a rather ambiguous passage, he concludes:
We tried to use body counts as a measurement to help us figure out
what we should be doing in Vietnam to win the war while putting
our troops at the least risk.  Every attempt to monitor progress in
286. Id.
287. Christian Appy notes that the “other war,” the pacification effort to “win the hearts
and minds,” was similarly evaluated under crude and generally inapt numerical measures:
Complicated questions about political loyalties and beliefs were reduced to questions
about the number of schoolhouses built or toothbrushes distributed.  The numbers is-
sued by those involved in the other war . . . always implied that the political affilia-
tions of civilians could be measured simply by how many goods or services were sup-
plied to them . . . .
APPY, supra note 237, at 157-58.
288. MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at 238.
289. Id.
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Vietnam during my tenure as secretary of defense was directed to-
ward those goals, but often the reports were misleading.290
To understand the purpose and meaning of the body count, one
needs to understand U.S. military objectives in Vietnam.  These ob-
jectives were not primarily to win and hold territory, nor even,
though we sometimes insisted otherwise, to capture the political loy-
alty of the South Vietnamese people (the so-called battle for their
hearts and minds).  American strategy, as designed by McNamara
and General William Westmoreland, was one of attrition.  The object
was to flush out and kill as many of the enemy as possible. Christian
Appy writes that the “overwhelming, even obsessive, focus of the
American mission . . . [was] to prevent communism in South Vietnam
by killing communists.”291  The warmakers believed that U.S. and
South Vietnamese forces would eventually either kill so many of the
enemy’s forces that it could no longer replace men as quickly as we
killed them (the holy grail “crossover point”), thereby crippling the
enemy, or, at least, inflicting enough pain that the enemy would will-
ingly agree to acceptable terms for peace.  Under this logic the body
count became more than another one of the military’s indicia of per-
formance, it became the indicium of military success or failure.
The attrition strategy created pressure all along the chain of
command for high body counts.  Body count inflation was rampant
and rewarded.  Most commissioned officers served a six-month tour
of duty in Vietnam, and they understood that their career advance-
ment depended largely on achieving big body counts in this short
time.  Some units rewarded soldiers with large numbers of confirmed
kills with R&R and whole units received leaves in reward for big
body counts.  Soldiers saw their officers lie about enemy kills and
were encouraged to do the same.  Late in the war, when Vietnamiza-
tion292 further demoralized the troops and combat evasion became
290. Id.
291. APPY, supra note 237, at 153.
292. “Vietnamization” refers to President Nixon’s policy (begun in 1969) of withdrawing
American troops from Vietnam and gradually increasing the involvement of Vietnamese
troops so that a stable Saigon would be left behind when the American troops were gone.  See
Luu Doan Hunyh, The Seven-Point Proposal of the PRG (July 1, 1971) and the U.S. Reaction,
in THE VIETNAM WAR: VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 265, at 200-
01.
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routine, officers would sometimes radio in fictitious reports of en-
gagements, with, necessarily, fictitious kills.293
The emphasis on body count created less benign means of in-
flating the numbers of enemy dead. As Stephen Ambrose notes:
“The obvious problem with the body count is that every body
counts.”294  Civilian deaths were seldom so reported.  Rather, civilian
and enemy dead were indifferently lumped together.  Philip Caputo
writes that “[t]he pressure on unit commanders to produce enemy
corpses was intense, and they in turn communicated it to their troops.
This led to such practices as counting civilians as Viet Cong.  ‘If it’s
dead and Vietnamese, it’s VC,’ was a rule of thumb in the bush.”295
This casualness toward civilian Vietnamese death, in turn, belied our
stated purpose of protecting the “good” Vietnamese from the depre-
dations of the “bad” ones and undermined many American soldiers’
sense of moral order.  Psychiatrist Jonathan Shay, who treats Viet-
nam veterans suffering with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, has
analyzed the sense of betrayal of their moral world that soldiers often
felt at the hands of their commanders.  One of Shay’s patients, an
Airborne trooper, recounted watching three boats unloading one
night when his unit got mistaken word that they were unloading
weapons.  His unit unleashed tremendous firepower on the boats.  He
continues:
293. See id. at 156; FRED TURNER, ECHOES OF COMBAT: THE VIETNAM WAR IN
AMERICAN MEMORY 26-27 (1996).  Inflated or totally invented body counts implied combat
heroics and required the awarding of medals.  See infra note 287 and accompanying text.  This
practice reached a particularly grotesque nadir in the setting of the My Lai massacre, which had
been reported as a military victory over the enemy’s nettlesome and elusive 48th Local Battal-
ion, in which 128 enemy soldiers had been killed.  See MICHAEL BILTON & KEVIN SIM, FOUR
HOURS IN MY LAI 173-74 (1992).  In addition to a message of congratulations from General
Westmoreland, such a decisive “victory” called for citations of valor.  Ironically, recipients of
citations included helicopter pilot Hugh Thompson and his crew, supposedly for rescuing civil-
ians caught in the crossfire between U.S. and  enemy forces.   See id. at 204-05.   Thompson and
his crew had in fact rescued civilians, but the account contained in the recommendation for
their citations was fictitious.  Thompson and his crew had actually rescued the civilians from
American soldiers.  At one point, Thompson had instructed his crew to turn their weapons on
the American soldiers if they resumed shooting civilians.  See id. at 137-40.  Also recommended
for citations were Captain Ernest Medina, the commander of the company responsible for the
massacre, and his superiors, Lieutenant Colonel Frank Barker and Colonel Oran Henderson.
Both Medina and Henderson would subsequently face courts-martial (Barker, who would also
have faced a court-martial, died in the interim), although both would escape conviction.  See id.
at 205.
294. STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, AMERICANS AT WAR 160 (1997).
295. PHILIP CAPUTO, A RUMOR OF WAR, xvii-xviii (1977).
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Daylight came [long pause], and we found out we killed a lot of
fishermen and kids. . . .
. . . .
The fucking colonel says, “Don’t worry about it.  We’ll take
care of it.”  Y’know, uh, “We got body count!” “We have body
count!”  So it starts working on your head.
So you know in your heart it’s wrong, but at the time, here’s
your superiors telling you that it was okay.  So, I mean, that’s okay
then, right?  This is part of war. Y’know? Gung-HO! Y’know?
“AirBORNE! AirBORNE! Let’s go!”
So we packed up and we moved out.
They wanted to give us a fucking Unit Citation—them fucking
maggots.  A lot of medals came down from it.  The lieutenants got
medals, and I know the colonel got his fucking medal.  And they
would have award ceremonies, y’know, I’d be standing like a fucking
jerk and they’d be handing out fucking medals for killing civilians.
. . . .
. . . So in your mind you’re saying, “Ah, fuck it, they’re Gooks.”
I was sick over it, after this happened.  I actually puked my guts
out.  You know what had happened, but—see, it’s all explained to
you by captains and colonels and majors that “that’s the hazards of
war.  They were in the wrong place.” Y’know, “It didn’t have any-
thing to do with us.  Fuck it.  They was suspects anyways.”296
The transformation of a soldier’s belief that he was in Vietnam
to defend the South Vietnamese to the belief that all Vietnamese
were the enemy came all too quickly for many Americans.  There
were several causes of that transition, including the hostility or ap-
parent indifference of many of the South Vietnamese toward their
“liberators,” the frustration of fighting an enemy who was almost al-
ways unseen, and who seemed to slip with ease into the jungle or the
populace, official hypocrisy regarding Vietnamese civilians, and the
incentives created by a war fought to achieve ever higher body
counts.  The resulting indifference to civilian death produced an envi-
ronment that spawned not only My Lai, but the many smaller atroci-
ties and rules of engagement that inevitably put civilians in the line of
fire, and which, by conservative estimates, caused at least half a mil-
296. JONATHAN SHAY, ACHILLES IN VIETNAM: COMBAT TRAUMA AND THE UNDOING OF
CHARACTER 3-4, 171 (1994) (emphasis omitted).
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lion civilian deaths and by some estimates caused as many as two
million.297
Against this backdrop, McNamara’s excuse that “often the re-
ports were misleading”298 is inadequate.  It is evasive in its adoption of
the passive voice.  He does not tell us whose reports were misleading
or who is to blame.299  He certainly does not blame himself.  Moreo-
ver, the problem, he tells us, was not his obsession with counting, but
his forced reliance on bad numbers.  Better numbers would have
297. See APPY, supra note 237, at 202-04 (supporting a half million civilian deaths as a con-
servative estimate); Edward P. Morgan, America’s Post-Vietnam Stress Disorder, 8 PEACE REV.
237, 239 (1996).  The attrition strategy adversely affected American combat soldiers, also.  Al-
though Americans engaged in what were nominally “search and destroy” missions (until Gen-
eral Westmoreland changed the name in 1968 to “sweeping operations,” “reconnaissance in
force,” or “search and clear” because of the negative image that “search and destroy” had
amongst the American public) the implication that U.S. forces would find the enemy and en-
gage him was generally not matched by reality.  See APPY, supra note 237, at 153-56.  Through-
out the war the enemy controlled when and where they would fight, and American troops were
highly unsuccessful in finding enemy soldiers who did not want to be found.  One early Penta-
gon study by Assistant Secretary of Defense Alain Enthoven determined that the enemy initi-
ated 79% and U.S. forces initiated only 14% of the firefights in its sample.  See id. at 163-64.  In
subsequent studies, American forces only did a little better; three years later, the enemy still
initiated 68% of the engagements.  See Ronald H. Spector, “How Do You Know If You’re
Winning?”: Perception and Reality in America’s Military Performance in Vietnam, 1965-1970, in
THE VIETNAM WAR: VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 268, at 155.
Said one former First Air Cavalry Division company commander:
They were superb at masking their true position.  The Americans would move up,
you would kill a couple and the rest would run and it was a natural tendency to take
off after them. . . .  In close terrain against enemy like the North Vietnamese that will
get you your nose bloodied. . . .  They were absolute masters at choosing the right
terrain at the right place at the right time to blow your crap away.
Id. at 156 (quoting interview with Lt. Col. Thomas G. Rhame, “Company Command in Viet-
nam” series, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pa.).
Given the inability of the U.S. forces generally to find and engage the enemy on its
terms, search and destroy was typically a tactic of dangling American troops as bait to draw the
enemy out into the open, where it would be exposed to American air and artillery fire power.
See APPY, supra note 237, at 182-87; TURNER, supra note 293, at 26.  The risks and frustrations
for the combat forces of being dangled as bait are obvious.  Further, the close-in use of rockets,
bombs and napalm exposed the combat troops to the danger of “friendly fire.”  One Pentagon
study determined that 15-20% of U.S. casualties were attributable to friendly fire.  See COL.
DAVID HACKWORTH & JULIE SHERMAN, ABOUT FACE: THE ODYSSEY OF AN AMERICAN
WARRIOR 594-95 (1989).
Jonathan Shay sees the sense of physical betrayal by superiors entrusted with their safety
in the tactics of search and destroy and the potential exposure to friendly fire, along with the
betrayal of the moral order by the indifference to civilian life encouraged by the way the war
was fought as major causal contributors to the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder of many Viet-
nam veterans.  See SHAY, supra note 296, at 196-97.
298. See supra text accompanying note 290.
299. Indeed, the passage is susceptible to the reading that newspaper accounts of Pentagon
inaccuracies were misleading, although I doubt he intends to say that.
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meant better planning, better decisions, and a better, though still un-
winnable, war.  He fails to acknowledge the consequences of the
American decision to fight a war of attrition and body counts.
The idolatry of reason and intelligence, and of their own ability,
was an earmark of those within the Kennedy and Johnson admini-
strations whom David Halberstam ironically called “the best and the
brightest.”300  Halberstam writes of the group that “they always
thought that no one else was quite as smart as they were, that they
could play games, and that no one else knew the score.”301
McNamara was hardly immune, and he remains under the spell to-
day.  Hence his self-nomination as an elder statesman deserving of an
audience, and his surprise and disappointment on his book tour that
no one seemed to want to talk about In Retrospect’s Appendix, which
discusses the continuing threat of nuclear arms.302  His idolatry of rea-
son and intelligence also produced the internal contradiction of lav-
ishing praise for their brilliance on the same people who made, by
McNamara’s own estimation, a horrible botch of our involvement in
Vietnam.  The Vietnam War, coupled with other disasters such as
Watergate, did much to erode trust and confidence in government.
We continue to see the effects of that loss of faith in the near paraly-
sis of government to do more than tinker with old ideas and initia-
tives, in the deepening disaffection of the electorate with the political
process and with those whom they elect, and in the apparently in-
creasing numbers of conspiracy theorists and participants in paramili-
tary patriot movements.  Certainly a big part of McNamara’s agenda
is to restore confidence in both government and in those who gov-
ern.303  His is a call for us to trust the policy experts (now educated by
the Vietnam experience) once again.
Finally, McNamara continues to put the United States at the
center of the universe.  This is partly an extension of his worship of
problem-solving intelligence and of those who have governed in our
recent past.  Just as the best and the brightest should govern in the
300. HALBERSTAM, supra note 228, at 525.
301. Id.
302. See Goodman, supra note 204 (“‘Please read the appendix,’  McNamara says to one
audience, promising that he will refund the whole price of the book to anyone who reads the
appendix about the dangers of nuclear war.”).
303. In describing why he had written “the book I planned never to write,” McNamara
states that his main reason for writing “is that I have grown sick at heart witnessing the cyni-
cism and even contempt with which so many people view our political institutions and leaders.”
MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at xv-xvi.
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collective best interest, even if to do so they must deceive Congress
and the American people, so should the United States act in accord
with its global ambitions in what had been declared “The American
Century.”304  This is the McNamara who on his first trip to Vietnam in
1961, having been frustrated in his efforts to find a cold drink, said,
“North Vietnam will never beat us. . . . They can’t even make ice
cubes.”305  Sadly, as he now admits, he did not know the Vietnamese
then.  Sadly, also, he does not seem to know them today.
McNamara’s continued Americacentrism can be seen in how lit-
tle the Vietnamese figure in his book.  With the exception of some of
the leadership (primarily Diem) they are missing in action.  He dem-
onstrates little interest in, or knowledge of, the country and its peo-
ple.  As Richard Reeves notes, “He still calls [Vietnam, a country of
over 70 million people, and over 1,000 miles in length] a ‘tiny’ coun-
try.”306  And he still focuses virtually exclusively on American harms.
The dominant post-war American myth, at least to judge by the
movies and the popular press, describes Vietnam as a frighteningly
otherworldly dark place where horrible things happened to well-
intentioned Americans who lost their innocence there (as did we as a
nation).307  The controlling image is of the American victim.  In Retro-
spect shares this edge of the frame focus.  That is not to say that the
war did not have devastating effects on the United States.  There was
wreckage aplenty, from the needlessly lost lives and shattered bodies
and minds of those sent to fight McNamara’s War to the derailing of
the post-World War II growth economy, the stillbirth of the Great
Society, the unraveling of the New Deal consensus, and the current
anti-government counterreformation.  Any accounting of the costs of
the Vietnam War must include these, along with other costs suffered
by the United States.  But it must also recognize that the war was
foremost a Vietnamese catastrophe.  Remarkably, McNamara gives
scant mention to the war’s costs endured by Vietnam and its peo-
ple.308  At the book’s end, he asks whether the costs were justified, but
304. The phrase is from publisher Henry Luce.  See JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, THE PROUD
DECADES: AMERICA IN WAR AND IN PEACE, 1941-1960, at 73-74 (1988).
305. JAMES S. OLSON & RANDY ROBERTS, WHERE THE DOMINO FELL: AMERICA AND
VIETNAM 1945 TO 1990, at 82 (1991).
306. Reeves, supra note 243, at 54.
307. How Vietnam is understood by the public, in contrast to how it has been represented
to them, is a far more complicated problem.
308. He does write:
It often proved difficult to distinguish combatants from noncombatants.  Between
1965 and 1967, U.S. and South Vietnamese air forces dropped over a million tons of
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his tally shows that only American costs count.309  To render the Viet-
namese so invisible in a war where perhaps three million Vietnamese
lives were lost and Vietnam suffered incalculable economic and envi-
ronmental devastation shows how much further McNamara needs to
go to overcome his bad faith and understand his past.310
In addition to its focus on how Americans and America were
harmed by the war, the postwar myth emphasizes our innocence and
the benevolence, however misguided, of the mission.  We commonly
hear that notion expressed in the description of U.S. involvement in
Vietnam as a “mistake.”  We make mistakes unintentionally, some-
times with the best of intentions.  McNamara, however, ought to have
known better.  That he does not is evident from his extraordinary
statement: “I truly believe that we made an error not of values and
intentions but of judgment and capabilities.”311  With that statement
McNamara indicates his belief that the tragedy of Vietnam was that
we fought an unwinnable war, did not recognize soon enough that it
was unwinnable, and, once we began to understand that stalemate
was inevitable, did not know how to get out quickly.  In other words,
had we won there would have been no need to confess, as McNamara
feels no need to confess regarding our intervention in the Dominican
Republic in 1965 to successfully bolster military rule against a popu-
lar uprising.312
Often, this story of lost American innocence comes coupled with
the quagmire metaphor.  In Retrospect is essentially an elaborate
bombs on the South, more than twice the tonnage dropped on the North.  Fighting
produced more and more civilian casualties and squalid refugee camps.  The in-
creasing destruction and misery brought on the country we were supposed to be
helping troubled me greatly.
MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at 243 (footnote omitted).  He also includes portions of the text of
his May 19, 1967 memorandum to President Johnson on “Future Actions in Vietnam,” in which
he wrote: “The picture of the world’s greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1000
noncombatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an
issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one.”  Id. at 269 (quoting Draft Memo-
randum for the President, Subject: Future Actions in Vietnam (May 19, 1967), Robert S.
McNamara Papers).
309. See id. at 319.
310. For an elaboration of this point, see Maurer, supra note 243, at 19.
311. MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at xvi.
312. In April-May of 1965, in what was later proven to be a vastly exaggerated response to
an overstated fear of communist insurrection, President Johnson sent 22,000 American troops
to the small Caribbean country to support the military regime.  See WALTER LAFEBER,
INEVITABLE REVOLUTIONS: THE UNITED STATES IN CENTRAL AMERICA 157-58 (1983).  John-
son advertised the move as a means of preventing another Cuba from threatening U.S. eco-
nomic development interests in the region.  See id.
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quagmire tale.  Brought to Vietnam by a combination of good inten-
tions and naiveté, America’s first gingerly steps were enough to mire
us.  With the assassination of President Kennedy, any hope of getting
out of the swamp of Vietnam disappeared.313  Instead, we were drawn
in ever deeper despite ourselves, and, as is so often true of quicksand,
we found it much more difficult to get out than to get in.  In The End
of Victory Culture, Tom Engelhardt notes two benefits of the quag-
mire metaphor for American war planners.314  First, it transformed
Americans from invaders into victims.  “For Americans, the initial
benefit of the word quagmire was that it ruled out the possibility of
planned aggression.  The image turned Vietnam into the aggressor,
not only transferring agency for all negative action to the land, but
also instantly devaluing it.”315  Second, the devaluation of the land
served as further proof of America’s good intentions.  “Here was no
rich land to be settled.  Its swampy nature made it valueless as real
estate and robbed the American presence of any suggestion of self-
interest.”316
McNamara’s personal narrative replicates America’s.  He also
acted with the best of intentions, if somewhat naively.  By the time
his doubts grew strong enough to produce the anguish he records, he,
like the U.S., was trapped in a policy of further escalation for fear of
the political and strategic consequences of withdrawal.  The quagmire
metaphor provides McNamara’s response to the many critics who ask
why he did not resign after he lost faith in the war he was charged
with prosecuting. McNamara himself was trapped until President
Johnson mercifully engineered his escape to the World Bank.
In keeping with the American myth of innocence and good in-
tentions, McNamara assumes the legality of and moral basis for our
intervention in Vietnam.  To do so he must assume that South Viet-
nam was a legitimate state, that North Vietnam was a separate ag-
gressor nation that had attacked South Vietnam, and that the Diem
government, and the various U.S.-supported governments that suc-
ceeded it, were freely elected, or at least represented the will of the
313. McNamara asserts, with no new evidence, that had Kennedy lived, he probably would
have disengaged from Vietnam.  See MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at 97.  His analysis, if taken
seriously, does much to undermine his grip of the domino-theory explanation for why we
fought in Vietnam, but he does not attempt to resolve the contradiction.
314. See TOM ENGELHARDT, THE END OF VICTORY CULTURE: COLD WAR AMERICA AND
THE DISILLUSIONING OF A GENERATION 198-200 (1995).
315. Id. at 199.
316. Id.
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South Vietnamese.317  Yet, as the well-trod history of the war shows,
none of those assumptions are true.  They can only be held by ignor-
ing the meaning of the 1954 Geneva Peace accords, the U.S. role in
obstructing their implementation and installing Diem, the repression
of the Diem regime and of its successors, and the popular rebellion
that emerged in response to U.S. imposition of a repressive govern-
ment on the South.  The myth of America’s innocent victimization,
which is critical to McNamara’s project of rehabilitating faith in gov-
ernment, in the liberal state, and in the American mission in the
world requires that we forget that “the shame of Vietnam has lain in
the intervention, not the defeat.”318
There is something to be said for McNamara’s anguished at-
tempts to come to terms with his past, especially when compared to
Henry Kissinger’s nights of undisturbed sleep,319 or General Westmo-
reland’s recent gloating that ultimately we won the war because
“[t]oday, Vietnam is a basket case.”320  Nonetheless, with his omis-
sions, attempts to shift blame onto others and to excuse himself, his
unwillingness or inability to recognize much of the harm that he has
done, and the tardiness of his confession, McNamara’s confession
falls short of the standards of either the Puritans or the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines.  Clearly, it has fallen short of the standards ex-
pected by his readers.321
What can we say about the social consequences of McNamara’s
confession?  Certainly, his hope of helping to heal the wounds of
Vietnam has gone unfulfilled.322  Instead, old hurts, often laying just
below the surface, reemerged unalleviated.  The book served as a
reminder of the extent to which we have unfinished business from the
Vietnam War.  Nor does he seem a candidate for the sort of public
rehabilitation that the unrepentant Richard Nixon, of all people,
achieved in his final years.
317. See Morgan, supra note 297, at 239; Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam War in American
Memory, in THE VIETNAM WAR: VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note
268, at 248, 250-51 (criticizing writings on the war which, though critical of military strategy,
leave undisturbed the premise that the intervention itself was morally sound).
318. Young, supra note 317, at 255.
319. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
320. Young, supra note 317, at 256 (quoting Fox Butterfield, Voices from the Past Sound
Out Again, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1991, at A14).
321. As well as many of his nonreaders.
322. On healing the wounds of the war as one reason for writing the book, see Ed Timms,
Interview: Robert S. McNamara, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 7, 1995, at 1J.
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Some of the functions of confession discussed above are simply
inapt because there is and will be no criminal proceeding.  There are
no judges whose consciences need easing.  Nor are there angry mobs
waiting to riot if sentence is executed without being embraced first by
the condemned.  Nor still is this an instance where confession serves
to bolster governing authority by renouncing sinful or criminal ways.
McNamara is not confessing the failure to conform to the norms of
his society in the manner of Esther Rodgers.  While he might have
confessed to war crimes and crimes against humanity, he does not.
Yet McNamara’s stated objective is to restore credibility to gov-
erning authority.  He does this, however, not from the margins of so-
ciety, as do most of the criminals that we have encountered in this
Article.  Rather, he speaks as a fallen member of a ruling, but tar-
nished, elite.  His task is uncommon, perhaps unique, in the tradition
of American confession literature.  It is also fraught with peril.  Be-
cause our experience with Vietnam involved our discovery of gov-
ernment deceit on a scale that was still capable of producing shock,
anything less than complete honesty on his part was likely to exacer-
bate the problem of cynicism and distrust that he wished to cure.  The
strong negative public reaction shows that his efforts to rehabilitate
his reputation and to restore faith in government and the foreign
policy establishment have failed abysmally.
As we saw of Puritan criminal conversion narratives323 and mod-
ern criminal statements of acceptance of responsibility,324 the stories
told banish other ways of framing our understanding of the events re-
counted.  This is also true of McNamara’s confession.  Certain topics,
such as the class-character of the war,325 or the secret war waged
against Laos with its gloves-off, near-annihilation bombing, are not
mentioned at all.326  Others are quickly dismissed, most notably by
323. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 233-37 and accompanying text.
326. The only bombing of Laos that McNamara mentions is that along the Ho Chi Minh
Trail.  See MCNAMARA, supra note 3, at 114, 227, 230, 245.  He makes no mention of the dev-
astating bombing on the Plain of Jars directed against the Pathet Lao and their supporters.  Of
Laos, one American official stated in 1960: “This is the end of nowhere.   We can do anything
we want here because Washington doesn’t seem to know it exists.”  See YOUNG, supra note
223, at 234.  The war in Laos was fought in that spirit, with the Central Intelligence Agency di-
recting mercenary ground forces and an air war waged by U.S. forces.  For additional discus-
sion concerning Laos, see id. at 234-35; Noam Chomsky, Laos, in AT WAR WITH ASIA 188
(1970); James P. Harrison, History’s Heaviest Bombing, in THE VIETNAM WAR: VIETNAMESE
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McNamara’s assertion that the mistakes that he and his colleagues
made were management errors, not errors of values.  In so doing, he
forecloses any considerations of the sources and consequences of
American globalism.
Nor has the book acted to create stronger bonds of social soli-
darity as we have seen other confessions do.  The Vietnam War, per-
haps coupled with the ugliness of American apartheid and resistance
to the civil rights movement, worked what Marilyn Young has de-
scribed as “the fragmentation of national identity.”327  No longer
would Americans uniformly see their history in terms of a metanarra-
tive of a mission to fulfill the Founders’ vision of freedom, democ-
racy, and self-determination.328  Unlike Esther Rodgers, or modern
federal criminal defendants, McNamara confesses to a nation still di-
vided over the Vietnam War and over various other issues that we as-
sociate with that era.  No wonder then, that the generals and admirals
who fought the war, and President Clinton, who did not, all point to
In Retrospect as vindication for their conduct at the time and their in-
terpretation of the war today.329  Indeed, the debate over the book has
often taken on the character of being another front in the war to de-
termine the meaning of our recent past.330
AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 268, at 130, 132 (noting the 1.5 million tons of
bombs dropped on Laos).
327. Marilyn Young, Dangerous History: Vietnam and the “Good War”, in HISTORY WARS:
THE ENOLA GAY AND OTHER BATTLES FOR THE AMERICAN PAST 199, 208 (Edward T. Linen-
thal & Tom Engelhardt eds., 1996) (suggesting that the national experience during the Vietnam
era forever altered our collective perception of American history).
328. See id. at 200-02.
329. See Eugene McCarthy, The Vindicator: McNamara’s Phony Redemption, NEW
REPUBLIC, May 15, 1995, at 14, 14 (criticizing those who feel “vindicated” by McNamara’s
“confession”).
330. The historical literature on the 1960s is large and growing, as is the variety of interpre-
tations of the period.  Others have attempted to characterize the period largely in the service of
current political ends.  See, e.g., PETER COLLIER & DAVID HOROWITZ, DESTRUCTIVE
GENERATION: SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT THE ‘60S (1989); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING
GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980 (1984).  Recent instances of Sixties-bashing
have typically been associated with Clinton-bashing.  For example, at the 1992 Republican
Convention, Marilyn Quayle suggested that, unlike the Clintons and other baby-boomer
Democrats, “Not everyone demonstrated, dropped out, took drugs, joined in the sexual revolu-
tion, or dodged the draft.”  David S. Broder & Ruth Marcus, Bush Nominated for “Fight of Our
Life,”; Marilyn Quayle, Martin Paint Clinton as Unfit for Presidency, WASH. POST, Aug. 20,
1992, at A1.  Nor did most women, Quayle added,  “wish to be liberated from their essential
natures as women.” Id. Also, after the 1994 Congressional elections, Speaker of the House
Newt Gingrich referred to the Clintons as “counterculture McGoverniks” and blamed the
lion’s share of the ills of American society on Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs.
Maureen Dowd, G.O.P.’s Rising Star Pledges to Right Wrongs of the Left, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
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III. CONCLUSION
All this talk . . . of a guilt complex displays something untruthful.
Psychiatry, from which the phrase is borrowed . . . implies that such
guilt feelings are pathological, inadequate to reality: “psychogenic”
as analysts call it.  With the help of the word “complex” the impres-
sion is created that the guilt—which so many fend off, abreact, or
deflect through the craziest rationalizations—is really no guilt at all,
but exists only inside them, in their psychological makeup.  So a real
and terrible past is rendered harmless by being transformed . . . into
a mere figment of the imagination of those who are affected by it.331
By God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all!332
One reason the Vietnam syndrome cannot be cured is because it is
not an illness.  Rather, the illness resides in the drive to cure our ma-
ture resistance to war.333
An important insight of the New England Puritans that seems
lost on most of the critics of In Retrospect is that of collective respon-
sibility for harms.  Much of the criticism of McNamara’s confession is
telling and appropriate.  Yet the discussion suggests that we have
made little progress as a country in coming to terms with our past.334
That we have learned something from the Vietnam experience
can be seen in the growing resistance of the American people to for-
1994, at A1; see also Dale Russakoff, Gingrich Lobs a Few More Bombs, WASH. POST, Nov. 10,
1994, at A1 (discussing same).  In a similar vein, see George Will’s column attributing the be-
havior of Melissa Drexler, an eighteen-year-old who, after concealing her pregnancy and giving
birth in the bathroom at her high school prom, discarded the baby in the trash and left it to die,
to “condom-dispensing schools,” sex education in schools, and to Roe v. Wade and “today’s
abortion culture.”  George Will, Thanks to Roe: A Mom, a Prom, a Dead Baby, PLAIN
DEALER (CLEV.), June 13, 1997.  Will’s analysis might have surprised Esther Rodgers, Sarah
Threeneedles, and the other young New England perpetrators of infanticide.
For a discussion of the battle over the meaning of the Sixties, see generally PAUL LYONS,
NEW LEFT, NEW RIGHT, AND THE LEGACY OF THE SIXTIES (1996).
331. Theodor W. Adorno, What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean, in BITBURG IN
MORAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 114, 117 (Geoffrey H. Hartman ed., 1986).  My thanks
to my colleague Ken Ledford for calling this essay to my attention.
332. Exclaimed by President George Bush the day after the American defeat of Iraq in the
Gulf War.  See HERRING, supra note 223, at 311.
333. AVITAL RONELL, Activist Supplement: Papers on the Gulf War, in FINITUDE’S SCORE:
ESSAYS FOR THE END OF THE MILLENNIUM 293, 296 (1994).
334. For additional discussion of how we remember Vietnam, see generally Morgan, supra
note 297, at 239-42; Young, supra note 327, at 200-09; Young, supra note 317, at 256.  I also
draw on Adorno, supra note 331, at 123-29.
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eign intervention and to deference to the executive branch regarding
what constitutes a threat to national security.  Those bent on unre-
strained exercise of American power in the world ridicule this ten-
dency as the “Vietnam Syndrome.”  In so doing, they medicalize and
dismiss as pathological the maturity that we lacked as a nation when
Robert McNamara served as Secretary of Defense.  Like those Ger-
mans who wished to dissolve all memory of responsibility for the
crimes of the Third Reich, these advocates of the new American cen-
tury see memory and history as threats to be contained.  As Theodor
Adorno noted of the German tendency to evade its recent Nazi past,
the problem is not primarily one of unconscious desires to tidy up
one’s history.  Rather, he wrote: “The effacement of memory is more
the achievement of an all-too-wakeful consciousness.”335  Adorno’s
observation that the struggle over how to remember the German past
was a political struggle is apt as well for the United States.
Too often, we seem to deal with Vietnam by slipping into fanta-
sies.  We cast our intervention as a well-intentioned blunder.  Ignor-
ing the ferociousness of the war and the costs imposed, primarily on
our “ally,” South Vietnam, we tell ourselves that the war could have
been won if the military had been “allowed to really fight.”  Inverting
the images of the war, as Michael Cimino’s The Deer Hunter336 inverts
the famous image of our agent, Chief of the South Vietnam National
Police, General Loan, shooting a bound Viet Cong suspect in the
head at point blank range, to turn America and Americans into the
victims and Vietnam and the Vietnamese into the aggressor,337 we
make the Vietnamese virtually disappear from the story.  Or we con-
gratulate ourselves for actually having won.338  The rest of the world
cannot abide such fantasies, and neither can we.
335. Adorno, supra note 331, at 117.
336. THE DEER HUNTER (EMI Films, Inc. 1978).
337. See Morgan, supra note 297, at 241.
338. See, e.g., W.W. Rostow, Rostow Sees Larger Victory in Loss in Vietnam, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Apr. 11, 1995, at A1 (claiming that although we lost the battle in Vietnam, it
helped us to win the war in Southeast Asia); Young, supra note 317, at 256 (citing General
Westmoreland’s boast that “[w]e won the . . . war after we left” (internal citations omitted)).
